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PHILOSOPHICAL EXERCISES

*INQUIRIES INTO PHENOMENOLOGY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE*



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INTRODUCTION

This book discusses different topics from phenomenology to philosophy of language; the topics discussed belong to different areas of philosophy even if it is possible to find a *fil rouge* that enables the reader to achieve a transversal point of view.

If we consider the idea of a *basic antireductionism* common to the topics of this book, it can be seen apparently that a diversity of themes with which we are concerned disappears in favor of an *homogeneity of sense* which pervades the arguments treated.

An important achievement of these essays is the weakening of the idea of the immediacy of knowledge: in Harvey's and Hintikka's interpretation of Husserl's thought, the opposition to the immediacy of knowledge rests on the assumption that there would be a mutual infiltration between the precategorical (sensible) and the categorial (rational) levels of experience so that the idea of a founding stratum of every possible experience could lose sense; Hintikka's and Harvey's suggestion is that we ought to *index*, through "hinge-concepts", the direction of the phenomenological analysis as a movement from the predicative level to a "rationally reconstructed" prepredicative one.

In the essay "Thing and Space in Husserl", the task of the theoretical reason is to show how the things conceived by the scientific and the natural thinking would be by-products of a *construction* upon the unitary and meaningful world of everyday experience: in this sense objective space is constituted through the concatenation of places available to me in my *kinesthetically* felt "near-sphere".

Sellars, from his point of view, denies that there would be a *basic level* at which knowledge would be a matter of an immediate encounter with its object, as if immediate knowledge were not inferred from any other knowledge. The major point of Sellars' view is the idea that numerous *tensions* are hidden in sense-datum theories, loyal to the myth of the Given, that can be characterized in these terms:

- a) knowledge of *facts* versus knowledge of *particulars*;
- b) *learned* versus *unlearned* cognitive capacities;
- c) *factualism* about knowledge versus *non-naturalism* about knowledge;
- d) inner episodes as *causal intermediaries* of empirical knowledge versus inner episodes as *epistemic intermediaries* of empirical knowledge.

Sellars fashions an account of sensation which construes this both *instrumentally* and *non epistemically*: sensations are neither the direct objects of knowledge, nor are they *primordial knowings*; they would belong to the *causal order* rather than to the *cognitive one*.

Sensations mediate and guide our perceptual knowledge of the world, even if this knowledge is not a *second-class knowing* inferred i.e. from the knowledge of items like color and sounds: our knowledge of the world is direct but mediated.

For this reason sensations cannot be considered like knowings: they are *states of perceivers* that are non epistemic in character and depending on external causes; sensations are a necessary condition of the intentional order, even if they do not belong to this order.

Wittgenstein, on his part, retains that the *many-dimensional* character of colour concepts makes them *ineffable*, so that every attempt goes wrong to reduce them to a more primitive ostensive game: colour concepts or colour words have a certain degree of *vagueness*, so that it results very difficult to achieve some sharpness or to draw boundaries; this task belongs to logic, not to the everyday language.

If we try to face the language game played by colour words, we cannot recur to “pen-and-ink” conceptual schemes even if some, as it were, “regularities”, some “unassailable” truths (e.g. the octahedron frame) must be presupposed to match colour issues. In our attempt to describe uses of colour-words, we must admit that 1) some sentences are often used on the *borderline* between logic and the empirical; 2) in philosophy it is not enough in every case to *say something* about an object, but also to learn *how to speak* about it.

What characterizes the following essays is also a certain degree of *antireductionism* and a mitigated use of an *a priori* way of looking to phenomenological or linguistic questions: in the case of the study on the prepredicative and the predicative layers of our experience of the world, the

antireductionist option is testified by the philosophical belief that the silent layer of the prepredicative experience has not the privilege of a full and immediate contact with reality, since every encounter of the world is *mediated* by culture, language, theoretical and practical habits which jeopardize the task of arriving at the “immediacy” of the experience; the *a priori* structures which preside over the experience of the world have an *hermeneutical load* due to the fact that every experience is already saturated with anticipations which are permeated by a certain degree of *typical familiarity* and *precognizance*.

In the essay “Thing and space in Husserl” the antireductionist line is showed by the importance of the Body, the lived body, for the constitution of the three-dimensional space, since thanks to my *Body* I am at the *center* of things and everything in my immediate surrounding is given a *location*. Husserl posits between the lived body and the objective space a *Sehraum*, a purely visual space, in order to make the objective space a *lived space*: the visual space has its own system of places (*Ortssystem*) which are never given without *kinesthetic motivations* which here, together with the pre-empirical qualities of things (size, color and so on), function as *a priori* constraints on our apprehension of the world. As regards Sellars the antireductionist character of his thought would rest in a way of approaching the philosophical enterprise which can be defined holistic: knowledge cannot be conceived as an accurate representing, the “mirror of nature”, since such accuracy would require a theory of *privileged representations* which cannot be approved; justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas and objects, but of *conversation*, of *social practice*. The American philosopher maintains traces of a *priori boundaries* of our world experience in the sense of conceptual schemes, for example the *manifest* or the *scientific images* of the world, even if these patterns or set of categories we operate with are potentially *dynamic*, changing under the impact of both experience and reflection: in this sense he seems to be more Hegelian than Kantian.

In the essay on Wittgenstein, the antireductionist flavor of his thought manifests itself in the idea that in order to get clear the idea about the meaning of a term like “colour”, one does not have to find the common element present in all its applications, because such an approach would dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases. Questions regarding the use of the term “colour” are very important for

they help clearing up relevant problems concerning, i.e., the relation between logic and experience, or language and perception. Such questions are so strongly linked that a reductionist approach is not able to tackle them.

CHAPTER 1

SOME PHENOMENOLOGICAL REMARKS ON PREPREDICATIVE AND PREDICATIVE IN HUSSERL

Summary

My aim is to discuss Hintikka's and Harvey's suggestion according to which we ought to "index" the direction of the phenomenological analysis in terms of a movement from the predicative level to a "rationally reconstructed" prepredicative one.

Such an assumption amounts, in my point of view, not to a mere *reformation* of the phenomenological enterprise, but much more to its radical *removal*: this assumption, as a matter of fact, carries with it the consequence that the idea of a *founding stratum* of every possible experience has no more sense; moreover, even the idea of the *immediacy of knowledge*, correlated with the former, is strongly weakened since notions as "thematic decision" or "thematic interest" are deprived of their prepredicative sense and intended as "hinge-concepts" in order to guarantee the passage from the categorial to the precategorial and conversely.

If Hintikka's and Harvey's strategy has the merit of making manifest Husserl's negligence of the importance of language, to some extent considered as a *by-product* of a more fundamental stratum, the same strategy, however, fails to appreciate the attempt made by Husserl of *entwining* receptive experience and predicative spontaneity, making use of notions such as "typical familiarity" or "precognizance".

Hintikka's and Harvey's analysis seems then suffering from an excess of *oversimplification*: but in other words, if all appears in contexts of meaningfulness, that is, of categorial formations, not all, as a matter of fact, can be reduced to a *culturally determined* experience.

1. From the prepredicative experience to the predicative judgment

In the essay “Modalization and Modalities”¹ Charles Harvey and Jaakko Hintikka attempt to evaluate Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of the genesis of primitive logical connectives like *negation* and *disjunction*.

This essay is mainly concerned with Husserl’s analysis of *modalization* in *Experience and Judgment*: modalized forms of consciousness occur when the *doxastic certainty* that pervades our daily lives is obstructed; suspicion then infiltrates the initial certainty that, in turn, becomes modalized.

By analyzing the modalized form of negation, Husserl traces the possibility of this logical connective to a *primitive certainty* which takes the world as “the universal ground of belief pregiven for every experience of individual objects”.² Once the negation of a simple belief occurs, then a retroactive modification of the retentive stream of consciousness takes place:

...the noematic modification stems back in the form of a retroactive cancellation in the retentive sphere and modifies the production of sense stemming from earlier phases of the perception.³

As with negation, also in the case of disjunction, a background of certainty is presupposed, even if the *Urdoxic consciousness* is always pervaded by an element of possibility: the “open possibilities”, which characterize the life of intentionality, are primitive forms of *conjunction* on the ground of which disjunction or negation are possible; thereby, consciousness of possibilities is itself an *intrinsic feature* of simple certainty.

More important thing, however, is the description of how predicative modalities would emerge from prepredicative experience and the reflection on the *grounding relation* subsisting between the precategory and the categorical dimension.

Husserl states that an actual predicative judgment (an act of confirmation, for example) happens only after the challenging of an earlier simple certainty by some doubt or optionality; thereby, confirmatory judgment always has the form of “a *decision* and of taking a position with regard to what has become doubtful”.⁴

According to Hintikka and Harvey, the notion of reflective and thematic decision is an ‘hinge-concept’, as it is the notion of *prereflective interest* in the sphere of passivity, that swings us from prepredicative modalization to the domain of

predicative modal judgments. They however add that this transition, analyzed by Husserl, from the prepredicative experience to the predicative judgment is “an awkward one”:

For, in turning to descriptions of predicative judgment Husserl must use the very same predicative language that he had to use to describe the prepredicative experience. Yet, in large part at least, the domain of prepredicative experience is a sublingual domain of happenings.⁵

2. The language argument

It seems, in Harvey’s and Hintikka’s point of view, that Husserl’s understanding of higher level predicative language has been ‘smuggled back’ into the analyses of lower level prepredicative experience; this presumed lacking of clarity in Husserl’s understanding of the right relation between the above mentioned levels of the life of consciousness, is due, in their point of view, to the negligence, in Husserl’s analyses, of the *dimension of language* that would stain even the *silent stratum* of experience.

Harvey and Hintikka point out that:

The problem posed by the language argument is that (1) it is not clear how Husserl’s descriptions of the “silent stratum” of experience can *make sense* without staining that privileged stratum with the ambiguities of language; and (2), once so stained, it is not clear that this privileged stratum is or ever was ‘privileged’ by a purified transcendental quietude in direct contact with sense.⁶

Moving from Harvey’s and Hintikka’s position, the *silent layer* of experience would have not the privilege of a *full and immediate contact* with the sense; for the same reason, Derrida’s task of washing up the most important notions of phenomenology, as “presence”, “evidence”, “selfgivenness”, in the muddy flux of the living language, maintains some plausibility.⁷

At this point of analysis then, it might have some theoretical consequences to stress the point that every encounter of the world is *mediated* by culture, linguistic structures, theoretical and practical habits (*Kleidungen*) which jeopardize the task of arriving at the “immediacy” (*Unmittelbarkeit*) of the experience which, in itself, turns out to be a patient work of *balancing* its descriptive content with its

hermeneutical load due the linguistic tradition into which experience has been expressed.

Ludwig Landgrebe explicates the idea as follows:

Wenn damit ein neuer Weg der Erschliessung der unmittelbaren Erfahrung gewiesen ist, so treten in der Durchführung dieses Programms doch Schwierigkeiten auf, die zeigen, dass dieser Weg für sich allein nicht genügen kann....Aber solche reine Beschreibung bedarf der Ausdrücke, in denen das Beschriebene erfasst wird, und wenn wir auf Erlebnisweisen reflektieren, so hat eine mehr als 200jährige Tradition die zu Termini verfestigten Ausdrücke geschaffen, in denen das Erleben, das Bewusstsein und seine Weisen erfasst worden.⁸

Additionally, he states the following:

Der Weg zum Unmittelbaren der Erfahrung ist also ein Ineinander von Deskription und kritischer Prüfung der dabei zunächst naiv angewandten Termini auf ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung hin....Nur in solchem Ineinander von Deskription und "Destruktion" kann sich die Erschliessung des Unmittelbaren der Erfahrung als eine Bewegung der Auslegung, Hermeneutik vollziehen.⁹

3. *The reverse constitution*

The proposal made by Harvey and Hintikka to overcome the theoretical perplexities tied to Husserl's conception of the relation between the precategoryal and the categorial spheres turns on the insight that any link between these two level must proceed from the predicative side:

This is because not only do higher level idealities "modify" lower level prepredicative experiences, but their retroactive effect is also one of "reverse constitution". And it is simply not clear that epoche and reduction can untangle us from the effects of such reverse constitution.¹⁰

It would be noteworthy to establish if a *reversing* of the relation subsisting between the predicative sphere and the prepredicative one, made possible by the priority assigned to the former, does justice to the fact that we live in a cultural world in which even ideal objectivities have their *full-fledged reality*.

Hintikka's and Harvey's suggestion is that we ought to "index" the direction of the phenomenological analysis as *a movement* from the predicative level to a "rationally reconstructed" prepredicative one, considering constituted idealities

not only as *clues* (as for Husserl), but also as *instruments* that “would actively lead us back to, and help us to rationally reconstruct the sphere of the prepredicative experience”.¹¹

Because of the *continuity* of the passage from one sphere to the other and of the *mutual infiltration* between the precategorical and the categorial levels of experience, the idea of a *founding stratum* of every possible experience loses sense.

Even the belief of the *immediacy of knowledge*, as a consequence of the theoretical position above proposed, is weakened, in a quasi-Sellarsian sense, insofar as notions as “thematic decision” or “thematic interest” are completely deprived of their prepredicative sense and intended as “hinge-concepts” in order to grant the passage from the categorial to the precategorical and conversely.

If we want to hold fast to the promises of phenomenology and if we want to see it as a particular philosophy of language, we ought to be compelled, following Husserl’s insight, to consider language as a *by-product* of a more fundamental stratum: in *Experience and Judgment* some aspects of linguistic acts, for example predication, are considered as founded in the pre-predicative experience *which is not formed by language*.

Husserl’s most important thesis in this work is that the exercises of the logical reason, in particular judgment and predication, would depend on a suitable experiential basis which can be analyzed *in abstraction* from the language used in the categorial dimension; then according to this point of view pre-linguistic experience would be *preorganized* into *rough types* which lay down expectations on the basis of past perceived similarities. These bundles of data are not a featureless clump, since they contain *independent pieces* and *dependent moments*: when we perceive an object, we highlight a piece or a moment of the same, while retaining the whole in *implicit grasp*: the part here is highlighted not just *per se*, but *as part* of the whole; moving back and forth our attentive grasp, we carry out an operation which is the *germ of predication*.

Husserl calls this operation “explication”: for instance, in the tree seen, I explicate its trunk (piece) or its color (moment); even if the part is taken as an object in its own right, it is considered however as a part *belonging to and emerging from* the prior whole; it results, as a matter of fact, a threefold structure: *whole, part, and*

the *part-whole* relation from which emerges the basic structure of all predication: *subject*, *attribute* and *copula*. Once explication has started, its results can be casted upon the subject and the procedure may continue: for instance, from the predicative judgment “S is p” we can move to the attributive one “S, which is p, is q”, and so on.

Through further investigation on the nature of the essential intuition, that is to say, of the method of *eidetic variation* whereby we are placed in *cognitive contact with universals*, Husserl’s philosophical enterprise, according to some critical scholars, would show its most plausible shortage for *even universals would show no trace of linguistic activity*.

Peter Simons explains the sense of Husserl’s misunderstanding of the role of language in experience with the following words:

That at least some such universals are fed us predigested by language appears not to concern Husserl. Here, as elsewhere in his philosophy of language, the social dimension of language, the fact that it is a community affair which is learnt interactively with already competent language users, and the constraints on learning imposed by this fact, are underemphasized. In part this is the result of bracketing other people and the social world, retaining for phenomenological consideration only our *sense* of these things, but for the most part he is simply not interested in anything but individual consciousness.¹²

4. The entwining of receptive experience and predicative spontaneity

What does Husserl precisely say about the above arisen questions?

In my opinion the paragraph 49 of *Experience and Judgment* dispels some above emerged doubts, since Husserl states here that, even if we ought to distinguish two levels of *interest*, and corresponding to these, two levels of *objectifying operations*: on the one hand, the *receptive experience*, on the other hand, the *predicative spontaneity*, this distinction, however, cannot be construed “as if different operations were somehow separate from each other”. Only for the sake of the analysis, the two levels are separated, even if they, as a *rule*, are actually closely *entwined*; this means that the receptive experience is not something independent, as if it were necessary first to run through a chain of receptive experiences before there could be an activation of cognition: for instance, we could at first *thematize* an object exclusively in the interest of cognition. These

few words however don't encourage us to assert that Husserl would have accepted the "reverse constitution" paradigm proposed by Harvey and Hintikka.

Husserl, in fact, explicates that:

These levels are, to be sure, always erected one upon the other; each step of the predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication, for only that can be originally predicated which has been originally given in an intuition, apprehended, and explicated.¹³

The same thing holds, according to Husserl, for a third and highest level, that of *conceptualizing thought* and *formation of generalities*; for every act of predicative judgment, every constitution of predicative forms includes *in se*, at the same time, a formation of generalities.

At this point of analysis, it is suitable to introduce the notions of *familiarity* and *sedimentation* that can play a role so as to defend Husserl from Hintikka's and Harvey's objections.

Just as every object of receptivity stands forth from the beginning as an object of a *type known* in some manner or other, so correlatively, says Husserl, in every predicative formation it already takes place a determination *as* this or that "on the basis of expressions inseparably entwined with every predication and on the basis of the general significations pertaining to these expressions".¹⁴

If, for instance, we make a judgment of perception of the simplest form, e.g. "S is p", determining this particular object S as green, then in this "being-determined-as-green" there is contained implicitly, by virtue of the generality of the expression "green", the relation to the general essence "green", although this relation is not made thematic as in the expression "this is a green object".

5. Typical familiarity and precognizance

The originality of an experience never implies, according to Husserl, an apprehension and an explication of an object which is completely unknown: on the contrary, the process which takes place in an original intuition is already *saturated with anticipation*:

... there is always more cointended apperceptively (*apperzeptiv mitgemeint*) than actually is given by intuition- precisely because every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already *an object in its horizon* of typical familiarity (*typischen Vertrautheit*) and precognizance (*Vorbekanntheit*).¹⁵

The apprehension of an object thus is never something ephemeral for, notwithstanding its progressive sinking into corresponding nonoriginal modes (retentional reverberation, empty dead past), it in no way disappears without a trace:

With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a *possession in the form of a habitus*, ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active association.¹⁶

At every stage of the process of object constitution, there is a “precipitate” (*Niederschlag*) of cognitions *in habitus*: the object has incorporated into itself the “forms of sense” (*Sinnesgestalten*) originally constituted in the acts of explication by virtue of a knowledge that has the form of a habitus (*habituelles Wissen*).

Alfred Schuetz gives much credit to Husserl’s account of the knowledge process, maintaining that the apprehension of objects takes place always inside the frame of an unquestioned (even if questionable) belief:

They [objects] are pre-given to us in the unquestioned (although always questionable) assurance of an uncontested belief, and thus not on the ground of a particular act of positing, and still less on the ground of an existential judgment. But our experience of these given objects shows two characteristics: in the first place, all objects of our experience have from the outset the character of typical familiarity; in the second place, the process of our apperceiving these objects by originary intuition is always permeated by anticipations of not actually apperceived but cointended features.¹⁷

The *typicality* of the objects apprehensions depends on their calling forth the recollection of other objectivities similar or even like the former; on the ground of it, other objectivities of a similar kind are apperceived by “apperceptive transference” (*apperzeptive Uebertragung*), from the outset, as objectivities of the same type, of a pre-given more or less specific familiarity.¹⁸

In these few remarks there is a partial answer to the doubts engendered by Harvey and Hintikka: in some sense, in fact, every apprehension, even the most original, is *contaminated* by past acquisitions in the form of an *habitual knowledge*; if, however, we allow that a categorial moment can be contained in an intuition of an object, this does not imply that a categorial moment ought to have so much as a *foundational character*; according to the phenomenological framework, at any rate *sense precedes conceptualization*: experience is first aesthetical, and then cultural, existential (Heidegger) and so on.

6. *Secondary sensuousness*

Over against the originally generative manner of givenness of the judgment, we have, conjoined with it, a *retentional* manner of givenness: wherever an original constitution of an objectivity of consciousness takes place, the original action (a judgment, a volition and so on) changes “with retentional continuity, *into a secondary form* (eine sekundaere Form), which is no longer an activity”.¹⁹ This changing into a passive form is called “secondary sensuousness” (*sekundaere Sinnlichkeit*): a judgment thus, becomes a *preserved acquisition* (*erhaltenden Erwerb*) dependent on functionings of passivity.

The importance of the preserved acquisitions is such that, without them, judgment processes, intended as “a living further-forming and connecting of meant categorialia to make the unity of continually new judgments at higher and higher levels”²⁰ would not be possible.

The judgment formation is a complicated many-membered (*vielgliedrig*) formation which, at the end of the process, doesn’t include in its originality any of the originally generated products belonging to its various levels and members.

In paragraph 5 of *Ideas II*, Husserl, taking into consideration the *interweavings* holding among the different consciousness acts, states that it is more easy *to see* these multiform phenomenons than to *designate it*.

The error, in my opinion, committed by Harvey and Hintikka is that of *oversimplifying* the way judgments arise in consciousness and, in doing so, they would omit the right phenomenological descriptions, filling in these with notions which, in some sense, *crystallize* and *reify* the life of consciousness. For instance,

they search for clarity in their phenomenological analysis where we could expect, say, “blurred matters of fact” (*verworrenen Zustaendlichkeiten*).²¹

The mistake of *reification* made by Harvey and Hintikka in their attempt to “translate” phenomenology into possible worlds semantics is not accidental, for *modalization*, which characterizes the life of consciousness, depending on the occurring evidences, is transformed into a *logical modeling* of the noemata, so that, for example, the intentionality of consciousness is not due to its *being-directed-toward*, but rather to its *informational nature*: the meaning, for example, of a logical disjunction like “ $S_1 \vee S_2$ ”, from an analytical point of view, is not intended in the sense of a *bifurcation of beliefs*, but instead in terms of a set of models (possible worlds) in which S_1 and S_2 are true.

The limit of such approach is that while it satisfies the aims of different intensional logics, it however shows signs of cracks by trying to adequate its fundamentally *extensional method* to phenomenological instances.

Mohanty explains his ideas as follows:

As long as our interest is simply providing semantics for various sorts of intensional logics, the lack of a genuine concept of sense does not matter. But for purposes of a phenomenology which is to provide descriptive structures of acts of consciousness, including the so-called propositional attitudes, the extensional function is far too inadequate.²²

All in all, Hintikka himself recognizes some difficulties concerning his attempt to reconcile possible worlds semantics with phenomenology, for some locutions such as “possible worlds” appear very unreal if applied to the phenomenological domain:

It would be more natural to speak of different possibilities concerning our ‘actual’ world than to speak of several possible worlds. For the purpose of logical and semantical analysis, the second locution is much more appropriate than the first, however, although I admit that it sounds somewhat weird and perhaps suggests that we are dealing with something much more unfamiliar and unrealistic than we are actually doing.²³

Analysis carried on by possible world semantics then doesn’t account for a valid justification of the link between *subject* and *world* and it cannot also provide for a

justification of the continuity subsisting between the *perceptual* and the *cognitive* levels; this is a kind of critique, for example, exerted by Cobb-Stevens:

- 1) The analytic project cannot be carried through, for logical analysis cannot establish any connection between words and world;
- 2) by contrast the phenomenological project of exploring the continuity between predication and perception makes for a coherent account of the objectivity of our knowledge...²⁴

An approach as that adopted by Harvey and Hintikka has also the disadvantage of *not discriminating* enough between different contexts and different uses of e.g. the term “world” which, on its turn, may have very different meanings: from that of the *formalized world* of logic to that of the *world in which we really live* up to the *metaphysical world* of reason; only a phenomenological analysis, more particularly a transcendental logic, can resolve the problems and paradoxes resulting from the lacking of the discrimination between these different meanings. Thomas Seeböhm points out:

Thus the paradoxes which are connected with the attempts to connect the different concepts of ‘world’ vanish. Quite another problem occurs which is a result of the separation. How can the explication of modal operators and other operators- as well as some intensional relations by means of this abstract apparatus- have objective validity for the explication of some categorical forms used in ordinary talk about the real world in which we live. Here we have a question about ‘objective validity’ which belongs to transcendental logic.²⁵

7. “*Kenntnis*” and “*Erkenntnis*”

Another mistake, in my opinion, made by Hintikka and Harvey consists of leaving out the important phenomenological difference between “*Kenntnis*” and “*Erkenntnis*”: even if “*Kenntnis*” is objectively directed, it is not yet “*Erkenntnis*” in the sense of predicative knowledge; Husserl distinguishes between “*Vorformen der Erkenntnis*” and “*Vollformen der Erkenntnis*”, so that omitting this difference, we would have already at the prepredicative level all the conceptual determinations of the categorial level.

We ought to separate then prepredicative experience (*Kenntnis*) from knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) on the basis of the following aspects:

- 1) der modus of “availability” (*Verfuegbarkeit*) which can be splitted into “habitual acquisition” (*habituellder Besitz*) and “available acquisition” (*verfuegbarer Besitz*);
- 2) the different *interests* presented respectively in the prepredicative and the predicative levels;
- 3) the different *objects* contained in these two levels of activity;
- 4) the different degrees (*Stufen*) of activity performed by the two levels;
- 5) the importance of the notion of “mediation” (*Mittelbarkeit*) intended as a watershed between precategoryal and categoryal life of consciousness.

The aspects which distinguish the prepredicative experience from knowledge are presented by Dieter Lohmar in his essay *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis*²⁶ with the following words:

Wir werden in der Folge sehen, dass sich vorpraedikative Erfahrung und Erkenntnis (1) in der Hinsicht auf den Modus der Verfuegbarkeit (*habituellder Besitz-verfuegbarer Besitz*), (2) im Hinblick auf das in den jeweiligen Akten lebendige Interesse, (3) durch ihren Gegestand, (4) durch die Stufe der Aktivitaet in den notwendigen Konstitutionsschritten und (5) durch ihre gegebene oder nicht gegebene Mitteilbarkeit.²⁷

As regards (1), we may add that *habitual knowledge* (in the sense of “Kenntnis”) is certainly a *lasting acquisition*, but not something that is available (*verfuegbar*) to us every time; on the contrary, an acquisition of the predicative sphere is available *for ever*: the judgment here holds *for ever* because, at the basis of a lasting available acquisition, there is a *modification of the will*: here “still holding” means “still willing”.

This intervention of the will is what discriminates the interest which pervades the prepredicative level from that present in the categoryal level: in the predicative sphere in fact there is a *willing participation* of the Ego at play: all determinations of the objects of consciousness are maintained (*festgehalten*) for ever (*ein fuer allemal*), that is, holding for all the subjects:

We return to what is reproduced as to an *acquisition*, actively produced in an act of will oriented toward this acquisition. As such, it is intentionally characterized. It is reproduced otherwise than in

a mere memory: *a modification of the will* is present, as with every acquisition (*Erwerb*). This gives it the character, not only of something which has been voluntarily apprehended earlier, but of an acquisition which still continues to be valid, which we still hold in our will, not now simply repeating the act of will, but willing in the form of reproduction, which is that of the ‘still’: I, present ego, as belonging to the particular mode of the present, am *still willing*... Thus *cognition as action is an activity with an aim*, an activity directed toward the possessive apprehension of true being and being-such of an object, its determinative characteristics, in the corresponding states of affairs.²⁸

In the predicative dimension of consciousness therefore to judge is a question of *decision-making*, that is, of appropriation “through which the active, strivingly active Ego appropriates to itself an acquisition, that is, an abiding knowledge”.²⁹ According to Husserl thus the abiding validity of a categorical acquisition is an “active acceptance”, a “declaring-something-as-valid”.

When I posit something as valid in an affirmative and judicative manner, I mean by this that it is settled for me from now on, as established for the future, and in particular, as being in this way or that. If we were to stand already within the sphere of expressive, predicative judging and in the sphere of communication, then the accomplishment of judgment would be articulated most acutely with the phrase, “I ascertain,” or also “I assert that.” But we must observe- and this belongs to the essence of judgment- that we do not already find the communicative relation in judgment’s first originality; as a rule the communicative relation is presented along with the expression, the assertion.³⁰

As regards (5), we note that the availability of the predicative acquisition is accomplished in the *dimension of language*: objective knowledge otherwise than prepredicative experience is possible only if the apprehended is communicated (*mitgeteilt*); the fixation of the meaning of a judgment in a verbal expression (*Ausdruck*) gives it an holding intersubjective validity.

The linguistic expression of predicative acquisitions, even if it occurs through “indications” at first empty, can lead to *envisionment* by presentification or by renewed self-giving of the identical.

In Husserl’s point of view, in the predicative sphere are constituted new kinds of objects which can be made thematic as logical structures and are called *categorical objectivities* or *objectivities of the understanding*.³¹

Thus, cognition, as a higher activity, can be seen, in contrast to receptivity, as “creative spontaneity” (*erzeugende Spontaneität*), in itself productive of objects; this, however, does not amount to recognize the cognition of the power of producing freely, without constraints, categorial objects. We might distinguish, as a matter of fact, between “herstellen” and “erzeugen” which are different activities of production: the “erzeugen” of the creative spontaneity has nothing to do with the “herstellen” by virtue of which we, as for a blacksmith, predelineate the result of the productive operation, projecting willingly into the future the determinations of the object we want to make.

At this point of the analysis, a term like “creative” means rather “a production of the knowledge of a self-given object”; what is in question here is, as it were, the realization of a tendency toward *self-givenness*; the ego lives in the activity of objectivation, even if “the striving of cognition, however, has its analogies with desirous striving”.

This position concerning the meaning of the expression “creative spontaneity” is also shared by Dieter Lohmar who states:

Diese ‘Erzeugung’ ist aber nicht als ein ‘Herstellen’ zu verstehen, bei dem wir das Ergebnis willentlich projektieren oder sogar erzwingen koennten. Es handelt sich auch nicht- wie der Kontext nahelegen koennte- um eine freie Schoepfung (‘Erzeugen’) von Verstandesgegenstaendlichkeiten selbst, sondern um ‘eine Erzeugung der Erkenntnis von einem selbstgegeben Gegenstand’.³²

Prepredicative experience and predicative formations are, in the point of view of a *genetic analysis*, different, for they perform different genetic steps; this does not mean that they *de facto* are separate from each other:

...this distinction of levels should not be construed as if the different operations were somehow separate from each other. On the contrary, things which must be treated separately for the sake of analysis and which, genetically, are recognized as belonging to different levels of objectification are *as a rule actually closely entwined*.³³

What does the term “entwined” properly means? Does the use of this term bring Husserl’s idea about the prepredicative and the predicative formations nearer to that of Harvey and Hintikka based on the notion of “reverse constitution”?

Regarding this question, Husserl has a clear opinion: it is certainly true that it is not always necessary first to run through a chain of receptive experiences before there could be an awakening of a categorial activity; we can, from the first, thematize a pregiven object only in the interest of cognition: in this case, predicative forming goes hand in hand with receptive apprehension; but all this does not mean that the foundation relation can be inverted:

Each step of the predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication, for only that can be originally predicated which has been originally given in an intuition, apprehended, and explicated³⁴.

8. *Practical vs. theoretical*

The view shared by Hintikka and Harvey, in my opinion, lays two important theoretical deficiencies before us: the first, *particular*, concerning with possible world semantics, the second, on the other hand, *more general*, involving the sense of the phenomenological enterprise.

According to Harvey and Hintikka, there would be, *prima facie*, a “philosophical discontinuity” between phenomenology and possible worlds semantics: for instance, the meaning of a disjunction ($S_1 \vee S_2$), in possible worlds semantics, is not explicated in terms of a *bifurcation of beliefs*, but in terms of the *theoretical sets of models* (possible worlds) in which S_1 and S_2 respectively are true:

What has taken place in the systematic logical theory of our century is not a modalization in Husserl's sense, but a modalization.³⁵

Notwithstanding this dissimilarity, they however argue that, rightly understood, the two approaches “complement” rather than contradict each other: they, as a matter of fact, would approach the same subject-matter even if from different directions. It is nevertheless a hard task to see *how* the two approaches would complement each other and *in which sense* they would concern the same

argument: *passivity* (modalization) and *activity* (modalities) involve an analysis of different consciousness fields which cannot anyway run in parallel; they entail, as a matter of fact, different forms of *temporalization* and apply to different kinds of objects (or “quasi-objects” in case of prepredicative apprehensions). For instance, for the *substantivation* in which the state of affairs is educed from a judgment “there is nothing analogous at the lower level”.³⁶

It is certainly true that looking at possible worlds semantics from a phenomenological point of view has the advantage of treating worlds only as “motivated worlds”; for the same reason, the notion of possibility itself needs to be reviewed in favor of *motivated possibilities*, that is to say, possibilities tied to fundamental *background beliefs* which predelineate the properties of the objects taken into consideration.

In contrast with Harvey's and Hintikka's view, however, it is hard to think that the shift from motivated possibilities to logical one is so plain as supposed by the two scholars.

Possible worlds semantics would *disengage* the possibilities it deals with from their constitutive sources, operating with *reified or pure possibilities*; therefore, possible worlds semantics runs the risk of being burdened with “the naïveté of an ontological discourse”³⁷.

Moreover, in assuming that a possible worlds semantics ought to be tied to a “world home” with a “principle of production” lodged within that world, that is, by *anchoring* the principle of production of possibilities to a *cognizing subject*, it is very easy to make this approach unrecognizable.

“Indexing” the key notions of possible worlds semantics with some, as it were, precategorical findings of the genetic phenomenology would amount, in my point of opinion, not to a complement operation, but to the recognition of their reciprocal impossibility to be reconciled.

Harvey and Hintikka take Mohanty's remarks on a phenomenological account of “possibility”³⁸ into serious consideration, but they would neglect the more important point of it: if we support a phenomenological point of view, we cannot give up an essential distinction concerning with the notion of possibility:

It is of importance that we elaborate in an exemplary fashion the contrast emerging here between possibility in the sense of merely “logical possibility”, mere possibility in the sense of merely “logical” possibility, mere possibility on the basis of intuitive representation, and practical possibility as the to-be-able-to.³⁹

In Husserl’s point of view, logical and practical possibilities derive both from a *neutrality modification*: the former from a neutrality modification of intuitive representation, the latter from a neutrality modification of acting into a *quasi-acting*⁴⁰. If we accept the primal of practical over against the theoretical, then we can construe the empty horizons belonging to any experience as a system of possibilities for practical intervention; all doxic-logical possibilities can be reduced, at least, to the practical “I can phantasize”.⁴¹

9. Husserl’s conception of history

The remarks made above have also some consequences on the interpretation of Husserl’s conception of *history*; he, in fact, would not countenance the view according to which every historical age and every world opening represent an *instantiation* of the truth: the outcome of such a thesis would be, as a matter of fact, that only inside an historical period we can decide what is true or what is not true. If for Heidegger, as a matter of fact, there is not an absolute truth valid for everyone⁴², but only *points of view* on which we are tuned (*bestimmt*) by virtue of our historical existence (*Dasein*), for Husserl, on the contrary, historical world is not all: the idea of truth doesn’t dissolve into the *variety* of the historical worlds; the latter are therefore referred intentionally to the idea of truth, that is, to a *unique world*.

Western culture, according to his view, results in an infinite difference between *representation* and *truth*; from this point of view, Husserl’s analysis of perception gives us not a theory of meaning, but a *theory of reference*.

The world then is the *transcendental condition* of the appearing of the things, of the actions and of the meanings: every judgment, that is, every categorial production is grounded on it; the *conditions of asseribility* (language, culture, norms, values and the like) presuppose the *conditions of manifestability*.⁴³

The world, in this view, is a *transcendental a priori* and as such the condition of possibility of every categorial or predicative acquisition:

The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. Waking life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly “conscious” of the world and of oneself as living in the world, actually experiencing [*erleben*] and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world.⁴⁴

If we neglect this theoretical and grounding position, we may run the risk of not understanding the core of phenomenology: a misunderstanding mistake into which Harvey and Hintikka would fall.

If all appears in *contexts* of meaningfulness, of categorial formations, not all can be reduced to a see *culturally determined*; this remark, however, does not mean that the constitution of the sensible field of the pregiven, the prepredicative level, is to be intended as an absolutely determined layer on which, in a second moment, we can add, without reciprocal influences, the high-order level, the categorial one: if this position were Husserl’s last word on the relation between the precategorial and the categorial level, we could not fulfill the possibility of passing from the world in its perceptual purity to the world in its practical (existential, aesthetical, historical) meaningfulness.

In *Ms. K III 6*, Husserl warns against the mistake of intending the relation between the world of representation and the world of the practical life as a founding relation which goes, in temporal succession, from the lower stock to the higher stock of experience:

Die Vorstellungswelt, die ich als Unterschichte der praktischen Welt beschreibe, so gar nicht als Unterschichte in der die praktische Subjektivität zunaechst ausser Spiel bleibt, beschrieben werden kann.⁴⁵

CHAPTER 2

THING AND SPACE IN HUSSERL

Summary

The phenomenological reason shows how the space and the thing conceived by the scientific and natural thinking are a *construction* upon the unitary and meaningful world of everyday experience; therefore the aim of this chapter is to analyze, from an Husserlian point of view, the most foundational layers of “space” and “thing” beginning from the most fundamental stratum, called by Husserl “phantom”, the mere *res extensa*, and arriving at *kinaesthetic fields* in which the apprehensional character of the things depends from the interplay of sequences of *K*’s (kinaesthetic circumstances) and *i*’s (correlative images) which blend into a unitary and meaningful system of experience.

1. Introduction

Thing and Space is the title of a course held by Edmund Husserl in the Summer semester 1907 at the University of Göttingen; the German original was published posthumously in 1973 as volume XVI of *Husserliana*. The course began with five introductory lectures which were published in 1947, bearing the title *The Idea of Phenomenology*.

The specific matters at issue in this course are “thing” and “space” which he analyzes under the general frame of a “critique of reason”.

While for Kant the task of reason amounts to constitute the scientific reality of thing, for Husserl instead, the thing at issue is the thing of everyday experience; what we need, Husserl declares, is:

to clarify, from the side of experiential cognition, not only the lower levels of the experience which lies prior to all deduction and induction- in short, prior to all logically mediated cognition in the usual sense- but also, and *a fortiori*, we would need to clarify the higher levels.¹

In short, theoretical reason aims at showing how the things conceived by the scientific and natural thinking result from a *construction* upon the unitary and meaningful things of everyday experience.

The focus of the analyses concerning thing and space is then the constitution of the most foundational layer of the most foundational things.

This lower foundational stratum, called by Husserl “phantom”, is the appearance of a mere *res extensa*, that is, an extended structure filled merely with *sense qualities* and not yet with *substantial properties*.

To do this job, the investigations ought to solve the *riddle of transcendence*, making the phenomenological reduction effective in order to arrive at a sphere of “pure phenomena”.²

Husserl prefaces the proper analysis of the “Thing-Lectures” with a brief introduction in which he affirms that the matter at issue is the analysis of natural, pre-scientific experience which has primarily a *perceptual character*; in and through this *natural attitude*, we experience a world that is *familiar* and always *already there*:

In the natural attitude of spirit, an existing world stands before our eyes, a world that extends infinitely in space, that now is, previously was, and in the future will be. This world consists of an inexhaustible abundance of things, which now endure and now change, combine with one another and then again separate, exercise effects on one another and then undergo them. We ourselves fit into this world; just as we find the world, so we find ourselves, and we encounter ourselves in the midst of this world. A pre-eminent position in this world, however, is proper to us: we find ourselves to be centers of reference for the rest of the world; it is our environment.³

Since the end of the XIX century, Husserl aims at the clarification of the *scientific concepts* by returning to the *intuitive ground* from which they spring; for this reason Husserl retains that the analysis of the *geometric space* ought to be anticipated by the investigation of the intuitive space which constitutes the *genetic foundation* of the former.

In *Raumbuch*, Husserl declares that what distinguishes geometrical concepts from experiential concepts is the fact that the former are obtained through a *process of idealization*; in this sense, they cannot be considered as *morphological concepts*

which are apprehended on the basis of sensible perception which is, *per definitionem*, inaccurate and vague.

Geometrical concepts, instead can be viewed as *passages to limits*, ideas in a Kantian sense, insofar they are guided by essential processes which *go beyond* the experience.

Notwithstanding this relevant difference between space of experience and space of geometry, it is undoubted, in Husserl's view, that *geometry takes root in the intuition*, since geometry has a *content fundament*.

In a brief to Natorp, dated 15.3.1897, Husserl affirms that through mere formal determinations we cannot arrive at space, but only to an *Euclidean variety*.

In §70 of *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, Husserl points out:

If we use the term 'space' of the familiar type of order of the world of phenomena talk of 'spaces' for which, e.g. the axiom of parallels does not hold, is naturally senseless. It is just as senseless to speak of differing geometries, when 'geometry' names the science of the space of the world of phenomena. But if we mean by 'space' the categorial form of world-space, and, correlatively, by geometry the categorial theoretic form of geometry in the ordinary sense, the space falls under a genus, which we can bound by laws, of pure, categorially determinate manifolds, in regard to which it is natural to speak of 'space' in a yet more extended sense.⁴

In this point of view, Euclidean geometry corresponds to the *most direct* idealization of the phenomenal space: it is, as a matter of fact, as *infinite*, *tridimensional*, *homogeneous*, *isotropic* as the space of intuition.

To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to underline that the processes of idealization, according to Husserl, don not occur "on" the ground of intuition, but are prepared "inside" of it through *passive synthesis* by virtue of which the world is constituted for us: idealization does not mean *construction* or even *abstraction*.

According to Husserl there is then a layer of experience which *precedes* language, historically determined cultures and science:

Thus one can put forward by itself the problem of the manner of being of the life-world; one can place oneself completely upon the ground of this straightforwardly intuited world, putting out of play all objective-scientific opinions and cognitions, in order to consider generally what kind of

“scientific” tasks to be resolved with universal validity, arise in respect to this world’s own manner of being⁵.

The world of experience is not a chaotic and disorganized world, but it has an *invariable style*, a particular spatial-temporal form.

To reach then the common layer of experience, we may begin with the leitmotiv represented by the constitution of the spatial thing.

2. *The thing in Ideas I*

In § 150 of *Ideas I*, Husserl considers how the region “physical thing” could serve as a *clue* for a phenomenological investigation.

We can arrive, Husserl notes, to the region “physical thing” through the attitude of *ideation*, proceeding like the geometer in the “freedom and purity” of his geometrical intuition.

He continues stating that the *regional idea* of the physical thing, that is, its identical X with its sense-contents “prescribes rules governing the multiplicities of appearances”.⁶

In this sense, Ullrich Claesges notes, *transcendence* reveals itself as a *noetic-noematic structure*, that is, as *modus* by virtue of which natural consciousness, through “Abschattungen”, posits the self manifesting object.

The totality of the essence of the thing remains transcendent, falling out from the field of the transcendental subjectivity:

Die Totalität des Wesens scheint in der transzendentalen Reflexion nicht einholbar. Das Wesen wird zu einem X, das in unaufhebbarer Diskrepanz zu dem steht, was von ihm zur adäquaten Gegebenheit kommen kann.⁷

Notwithstanding the inaccessibility of the totality of the essence “physical thing”, we can note, through eidetic variation, that each physical thing-appearance necessarily includes in itself a stratum called by Husserl “physical thing-schema”:

...it is the spatial shape merely filled with “sensuous” qualities- without any determinateness of “substantiality” and “causality”...⁸

Adopting this way of investigating the problems concerning phenomenological constitution, Husserl concludes that all the troubles regarding the origin of the idea of space can be *reduced* to the phenomenological analysis of the essence of all noematic and noetic phenomena in which space is intuitively presented and constituted as the unity of appearances; for this reason we comprehend the *intimate link* which ties thing and space in phenomenological investigations.

Through originary experiencing consciousness we can arrive at determining the different levels and the strata of physical thing-constitution:

Every level, and every stratum in the level, is characterized by the fact that it *constitutes an own peculiar unity* which, on its side, is a *necessary middle member* for the full constitution of the physical thing.⁹

To begin with, we ought to consider that in pure *phenomenological attitude* there are groups of features which are not represented in the apprehension; the thing which appears at rest and unchanged qualitatively shows us only its schema, so that it is not yet so much as a thing, that is, a thing in the usual sense as *material-real*.

It is also remarkable to note that the concept of *schema* (the concept of *phantom*) cannot be restricted merely to a single sense-sphere:

A perceived thing also has its *tactual schema*, which comes to light in tactual grasping. In general, *there are precisely as many strata there to be distinguished in the full schema as there are to be found classes of sensuous data* which are spread over the spatial extension (appearing as something identical) of the thing.¹⁰

If up to now, we have taken the thing in isolation, it is time to consider that it is in relation to “circumstances” that the thing is what it is.

Reality, called also “materiality”, as a matter of fact, does not lie only in the mere sensuous schema; there are in fact some *functional connections* which relate the schematic modifications of one aspect to those of other aspects.

So long as the circumstances remain unchanged, the schema remains unchanged as well; at any rate, there is a rule according to which to *similar circumstances belong similar functional dependencies*:

A steel spring, once struck, executes certain oscillations and runs through certain successions of states of relative change of place and deformation: the spring has the real property of “elasticity”. As soon as a certain impetus is given, there occurs a corresponding deviation from the state of rest and a certain corresponding mode of oscillation.¹¹

The apperception of real properties include, as a matter of fact, not only the articulation in circumstances but also the functionally dependent changes of the schemata in such a way that this dependency holds in any given case.

By virtue of a “realizing apprehension”, that is, of a kind of apprehension which constitutes the real thing as *substrate* of real properties, the schema or phantom acquires the character of a real determinateness:

Over against the real unitary property, in our example the unchanged Objective color, there stands the momentary real *state*, which corresponds to the “circumstances” and which changes according to rules. The state coincides with the schema; yet it is not a mere schema (the thing is indeed not a mere phantom).¹²

The thing-apprehension then considers the schema not exclusively as an extension filled merely sensuously but also as primal manifestation or “documentation” of real and causal properties; causal dependencies, according to Husserl, come to originary givenness, that is, they are not merely supposed, but also *seen* or *perceived*.

Thus is possible to have various grasping of the thing, even if it is the *identical substrate* of states related to different circumstances:

There are as many directions of unity prefigured in the causal apprehension of the schema (i.e., directions for possible series or perceptions in functional relation to series of perceptible circumstances) as there is multiplicity in the way in which the reality-thing, the unitary material “substance”, is determinable according to *properties* corresponding to the apprehended sense itself.¹³

3. Systematic constitution of space

Each body is constituted, according to Husserl, in an *orientation* and this means that each body is given to intuition in a kind of “quality”, in a location which has its dimensional modifications.

A body, as it is discussed above, is constituted as a sensuous schema by the sense of *sight* and *touch*, but this is not the end of the story: every sense in fact is a sense only “through an apperceptive conjunction of the corresponding sense-data with kinaesthetic data”.¹⁴

The kinaesthetic field is, in Husserl’s point of view, a field of *continuous* data; a kinaesthetic field is variable *immediately* and *freely*.

The kinaesthetic field is introduced by Husserl for the purpose of penetrating as deeply as possible into the phenomenological constitution of the three dimensional spatiality: all spatiality, as a matter of fact, comes to givennes in movement, that is, in the movement of the object itself and in the movement of the Ego. It is, as a matter of fact, a *phenomenological law* of constitution that the unity of the object demonstrates itself only in the unity of *synthesis* continually joining the manifold of perceptions:

In our case, it means that an identical and unchanged spatial body demonstrates itself as such only in kinetic series of perceptions, which continually brings to appearance the various sides of that thing.¹⁵

Visual contents are not sufficient in themselves to serve as apprehensional contents for visual spatiality and for a thing in general even if only visual and tactile contents have the peculiarity of *coalescing* into fields, capable as they are of bringing a thing to presentation; classes of sensation that have no fields are therefore incapable of a *projective presentation*:

I am naturally thinking here of the sensations of movement. They play an essential role in the apprehension of every external thing, but they are not themselves apprehended in such a way that they make representable either a proper or an improper matter; they do not belong to the “projection” of the thing. Nothing qualitative corresponds to them in the thing, nor they adumbrate bodies or present them by way of projection. And yet without their cooperation there is no body there, no thing.¹⁶

However, according to Husserl, the incapability of the sensations of movement to present any matter does not apply to the Ego-Body into which these sensations are *inserted* as appearances. If, as a matter of fact, the Body is also a thing, a physical

thing like any other, on the other hand it is the *bearer* of the Ego: which has sensations that are *localized* in the Body.

The touching hand “appears” as having touch sensations. If we turn to the touched Object, smoothness and roughness appear as belonging to it. But if I attend to the touching hand, then it possesses the sensation of smoothness and the sensation of roughness, and it possesses them on or in the appearing finger tips. Likewise, the sensations of location and of movement, which have their Objectivating function, are attributed immediately to the hand and to the arm, as encased in them.¹⁷

4. *The correlation between the visual field and the kinaesthetic sequences*

Every field is, according to Husserl, a fixed system of locations and this means that every element of sensation has its corresponding location, its “here”; more particularly, the visual field is a two-dimensional manifold which is in itself *congruent, continuous, utterly coherent, finite and bounded*.

All the terms that are appropriate to the visual field, such as line, point, location, shape cannot be, in Husserl’s point of view, understood in the spatial sense:

We already said earlier that the visual field is not some sort of surface in Objective space, which makes no sense, any more than points and lines in the visual field are points and lines in Objective space or even have any spatial relation whatsoever to spatial points and lines.¹⁸

A *concretum* in the field can change “*quasi-materially*” (“quasi” means here that the parameters involved are not empirically objective, but phenomenological law-like) according to variables like quality, brilliance, saturation and so on; it can also change in size, shape or location by virtue of kinaesthetic sequences.

Kinaesthetic sensations lack an *essential relation* to the visual sensations, “they are connected to them functionally but not essentially”;¹⁹ kinaesthetic sensations form continuous multidimensional systems in which continuous unities appear only as sequences, that is, by filling a span of time.

For instance, we assume that a kinaesthetic ocular sensation K_1 is at first constant, the thing remaining stationary too, during the stream of time t_0-t_1 ; in this streaming time then the visual image i_1 remains also constant. If then K_1 changes, in a continuous sequence, into K_2 , then the image i_1 , during the new span of time, changes also into i_2 .

If K_2 reverts back to K_1 , then also i_2 changes into i_1 in the same time span:

In every appearance of a stationary thing, these two factors or sensation are involved, the K-factor and the i-factor. Their relation is one of dependence, as we have just attempted to determine. And the dependence is reciprocal. The same K-sensation is accompanied by the same image, and the same image also by the same K-sensation.²⁰

To a complex of K's and i's is attached an *apprehensional character* which refers to the possible sequences of *i* in the total system under the possible kinaesthetic circumstances; *ideal possibilities of fulfillment* then arise in the elapsing of such system:

In every such nexus of fulfillment, the images are subtended by the consciousness of unity, which is and remains the same, where the appurtenant appearances are fulfilled, under the relevant kinaesthetic circumstances, in the sense of the general type.²¹

The consciousness of unity constitutes the one identical thing as is presented identically *through* the images and *under* the relevant circumstances; the continuity of images is a *linear manifold* "extracted out" of a *multidimensional* manifold of possible images which are linked to K's through the unity of the continuity of apprehension: the latter unites the K's and the i's belonging to every temporal phase into an apprehensional unity.

According to Husserl, there are two important and essential components belonging to the temporal elapsing of each apprehensional phase: the *i*-component and the K-component.

The former supplies the "intention toward," the latter the motivation of this intention. The "intention toward" is differentiated and directed in such and such a way under these circumstances K. More precisely, the stream of the K's or, to be exact, the stream of these K's, determines by way of motivation the type and form of the "intention toward" in its elapsing. Every phase of the i-component is an "intention toward" in such a way that it penetrates the next phase, i.e., penetrates its image, by referring to it and referring through it: here the i-component fulfills itself, but it again penetrates the next phase and again is fulfilled, etc., such that every I is both fulfillment and fulfilling and is so natural by means of its apprehensional function.²²

The system of *K*'s becomes more complex when we expand the system of movements: besides the elapsing of kinaesthetic sensations of the eye, designated above as *K*, there might elapse kinaesthetic sensations pertaining to the *head*, the *trunk* and so on. In this respect, we are provided, as it were, with a complex of variables (*K*, *K'*, *K''*,...) that, as Husserl notes, are *independently* variable in relation to one another but in such a way that they form a system where each of the variables has a definite value:

Nevertheless, since the change in the images, i.e., the character of the delimitation and fulfillment of the visual field, is not merely dependent on the individual *K*-variables, but also on the manifold system (*K*, *K'*, *K''*, ...), and since the variation of the *K*'s (a name for the "*K*", *K'*", *K''*", ...), in the case of the constancy of *K*, determines new occurrences and manifolds of images of a new type, the intentional system from the very outset is therefore a complicated one.²³

5. The constitution of space: the stationary thing

Let us start from an absolutely stationary world of things, a world, as it were, which lacks qualitative or phoronomic changes of its Objects; *qualitative discontinuity* is what gives the oculomotor image separate existence: the figure or object is distinguished by the fact that its coloration does not blend into that of the surroundings. Change in *orientation* and in *expansion*, in the continuity of the oculomotor fields, creates unities of appurtenance and contains principles of conjunction; notwithstanding such changes, an *identity* penetrates every constant modification so that "every part which has arisen as continuous out of one part of the original image presents the same image".²⁴

The same holds for the *concealment*: if an image constantly obliterates another image then, according to a *rule*, the image that is not yet obliterated remains a presentation of the same thing; when nevertheless the movement is reversed the Object is continuously built back up:

This constant demolition and rebuilding due to such a concealing Object is a system of modifications which is strictly motivated by the kinaesthetic circumstances.²⁵

When an Object is constantly concealed, its full intentions, as a matter of fact, become empty, even if they do not lack the character of perceptual intentions, motivated in the *motivational nexus*.

Let us now proceed to the class of modifications included under the term “expansion”; it can apply unitarily to the whole field or to different pieces of the same.

It holds, according to a phenomenological law, that what pertains to the unity of a continuous expansion also pertains to the unity of a presentation; admittedly, it is possible that different types of expansion can indeed be joined into the unity of an object:

Think, for instance, of the case of two mutually bounded surfaces. Let us take simultaneously visible and mutually bounded surfaces of a polyhedron which present themselves in different expansional modifications. Yet the two series of modifications belong together; they pertain to the same kinaesthetic circumstances, they stream on together, and they form in this unitary stream a determinate type of unitary modification.²⁶

Expansion moreover can be mixed with concealment as in the case of an undulating surface which undergoes kinaesthetic change.

Under the heading of the modification of *turning*, we require that concealment and unconcealment are in play in a way different from that in which the acquisition and loss of presentational content have their source in the entering and exiting of parts of images into or out of the oculomotor field.

Husserl distinguishes between “pure receding” which is a *linear modification*, that is, a kinaesthetic system in which the motivating circumstances vary infinitely in a *linearly orthoid* manner form, and “pure turning” that is a *cyclical modification* where the kinaesthetic circumstances vary cyclically, bringing back the turning series of images.

When an object undergoes a modification of *remoteness*, the image contracts *in infinitum*, having the “null-point” as the limit; in the reverse direction, we encounter the infinite enlargement of the image: in these cases the appearing side is ever the same; the other sides, as it were, appear through the possible modifications of turning.

Husserl remarks that mere expansion is a modification that is not related to mere change in orientation, because the latter is the *displacement* or *rotation* of a figure that maintains its identity in the oculomotor field:

As regards expansion, on the other hand, the points do not retain their reciprocal orientation. The concept of expansion implies in the first place, generally speaking, a change in the location of the points in the field. Where all the points maintain their location, we can naturally not speak of a modification.²⁷

Turning, as distinct from expansion, constantly brings new presentational contents so that to say “the object is turning” means the same as saying that it constantly shows itself from new sides; when a complete revolution is carried out, the sequential appearance of sides brings to appearance the *closedness* of the nexus of sides and therefore, gets the complete corporeal surface to appear as a closed one. Expansional modification lacks, as mere receding and approaching, the cyclical character; it has the character of “bilaterality” where “bilateral” means that it has two and only two directions which fuse as opposites into a linear manifold.

6. Qualitative and phoronomic change of the thing

In the preceding remarks we have started from the assumption that the world of things is absolutely stationary, stationary not only in the phoronomic sense, but also in the qualitative one. We can consider now the changeableness of qualities, e.g. coloration, of the things; everything has its *pre-empirical form* (size for example) and its pre-empirical qualities (color, for example) as filling the form in all its parts: both these components can undergo their changes, thus constituting the objective form filled throughout with objective qualities.

Coloration, Husserl adds, is, on one side, variable independently of the form, but, on the other side, it is inseparable from the form because it reveals itself as the condition of possibility of the concrete form, that is, a condition of possibility for the constitution of corporeality.

As to the question of how is the thing constituted as identical in qualitative change, we can state that the thing is what is unitary when the qualities change

and the form remains identical: the thing is a *multidimensional infinite manifold* of image-modifications which becomes the bearer of the consciousness of unity; when, i.e., the coloration changes unexpectedly, then the actual perception experiences a leap by virtue of which it no longer elapses in the sense of the original apprehension. In this way, the apprehension *disappoints* the intention instead of *fulfilling* it so that the consciousness has the form of the “otherwise”.

When the coloration changes continuously, kinaesthesias can be absolutely stationary for a certain period of time: in this case, the image endures unchanged with regard to pre-empirical form and location, even if the coloration changes. Passing over to the complete system of kinaesthetic motivations, the image is absorbed into the infinities of possible modifications pertaining to the kinaesthetic systems of the Body:

In the system of absolute non-change, there pertains to every kinaesthetic situation, to every determinate Bodily position (once the coordination is carried out through a first perception), a strictly determinate appearance according to color as well as form, and to every kinaesthetic series, to every determinate change in position, there pertains a determinate series of appearances.²⁸

A second basic type of change is *movement*, first of all, movement without qualitative change, thus mere movement.

What characterizes movement is the fact that the object occupies different locations, thus undergoing a change, even if it remains the same: sameness here means that two co-existing things are completely the same, except for their location, if each of them is constituted in the same manifold of appearances. Their difference can reside only in the kinaesthetic relations, in their relations to other things; in this case, the continuous change does not affect the kinaesthetic coordination:

For instance, if I keep my body stationary, perhaps while sitting, and even keep my eyes still, then, at the beginning of the course of movement of the thing, the image α pertains to this bodily posture, thus to the determinate K-complex. Now the thing moves. If we extract a phase of the movement, it offers a different image, β as pertaining to the same K (I am still sitting) but to a different time. Thereby, however, this β -image also already pertains to the thing in its initial location, prior to the movement. But in order to reach this image, I must assume a different bodily

posture: K' . Due to the movement of the thing, however, β is now connected to K instead of K' . Likewise, α also pertains to the thing in its new location, but α is not coordinated to K but to a different K , let us say K'' .²⁹

7. *The importance of the Body for Husserl*

According to Husserl, the importance of the Body, intended as lived body, is not only due to the fact that it is the basis of the constitution of the three-dimensional space, but also to the more massive fact that everything that appears belongs to its (the lived body's) environs; thanks to the Body I am at the center of things and, for this reason, the "I-myself" is a bodily self, as it were, the "I-center" of all my experiences.

My Body then can be conceived as a "null-body" (*Nullkoerper*) thanks to which everything in my immediate surrounding is given a *location*.

My Body, as the *zero point* in analytical geometry, has the property of seeming always to be unmoving in relation to the surrounding world; it moreover presents fundamental anomalies which distinguish it from all other things:

In popular terms, every thing in the whole world can escape from me, except for my own Body... the manifold of images that pertains to the Body has a distinctive kinaesthetic motivation in contrast to other things.³⁰

For instance, when we walk we do not experience only a movement of the legs in relation to the other parts of the Body, but also a movement of the entire visible Body through a change in its distance from other bodies; the Ego-point does not recede, it is always co-moved:

The Body moves, but does so without "receding" from itself: the images of it do not change in the sense of "receding". In this way, therefore, the Ego moves.³¹

The Body thus is stationary to itself so that the true *stabilitas loci* is not to be found in God or in the enduring landmarks, but in myself.

According to Edward Casey, Kant was right to think that the Body is the source of orientation, but he did not show that it is such a source only inasmuch it is the stable center of the perceptual field.³²

Husserl posits between the lived body and the objective space a *Sehraum*, a purely visual space, in order to make the objective space a *lived space*: the visual space has its own system of places (*Ortssystem*) even if the notion of “place” here is conceived mainly as simple location; this last assumption would be demonstrated by the fact that Husserl uses *Ort* (place) and *Lage* (position) interchangeable.³³

Anyway, it seems that Husserl introduces a new conception of place: as a matter of fact, the kinesthetic motivations make of the invariably given manifold of places something which is never given without a *K* (e.g. a kinaesthetic sensation). The feeling of my own body being or moving in a place affects the way I experience that place.

Casey writes:

And if kinesthetic self-awareness is itself the basic form that awareness of my body takes (whether this corporeal consciousness be visual or tactile), then it will constitute a privileged entry into place as I actually experience it. Feeling my body means feeling how it is to occupy the place it is in.³⁴

Kinesthetic self-awareness has the character of spontaneity (*Spontaneität*) and this means that its domain is a system of kinaesthetic situations; this character has the form of a “von-mir-aus-Geschehen”³⁵, as it were, of an *occurring thanks to me*. Such a system, determined as spontaneity of the kinaesthetic consciousness, actualizes practical possibilities (*Vermöglichkeiten*) and, for this reason, it has the character of movement (*Bewegung*).

It is also plausible, on the ground of phenomenological analyses, to suppose that receptivity (*Rezeptivität*), that is, the givenness of appearances in an objective apprehension, would depend on kinaesthetic situations so that even the passive layer of consciousness would be founded on the active layer of the same³⁶; the link and interaction between receptivity and spontaneity can be achieved by the

consciousness of the Body which functions as a structural regulative system (*Regelstruktur*).

Claesges states as:

Durch den Leib (als Moment des kinaesthetischen Bewusstseins) wird die Rezeptivitaet so geregelt, dass *sie nur als Empfindung moeglich ist*, d.h. zugleich immer auch als ein Vorkommnis an einer in Raum und Zeit erscheinenden Gegenstaendlichkeit aufgefasst werden kann.³⁷

The foundational correlation between receptivity and spontaneity would depend ultimately on the uniqueness of the Body : it, as a matter of fact, comes ahead of every constitution of spatial-temporal objects, even ahead of that constitution thanks to which it appears as *res extensa*. The Body is not primarily an object, it is much more a structural totality (*Strukturganzheit*) that belongs to the *a priori* of the perceptual and kinaesthetic consciousness.

The Body, in contrast with other objects, is constituted by the “reflection” (*Reflexivitaet*) of the tactile system; insofar as it is subject to the availableness (*Verfuegbarkeit*) of the Ego, the Body reveals itself as an Ego opposed to the outer world:

Dadurch ergibt sich ein doppeltes Verhaeltnis des Ich zu seinem Leibe. Einmal muss sich das Ich mit seinem Leibe identifizieren koennen, den sonst waere nicht einsichtig, wieso das Ich selber in der Welt sein koennte; zum anderen muss sich das Ich von seinem Leib unterscheiden koennen, denn der Leib ist eine kinaestetisch konstituierte Gegenstaendlichkeit, die als solche ein Ich der kinaesthetischen Vermoeglichkeiten voraussetzt.³⁸

Husserl seems to lack an articulated concept of lived space, even if he resorts to various substitutes of the same: think not only of the notion of “concrete appearance” (*Apparenz*), but also, and above all, of that of the “the near-sphere” (*Nahsphaere*):

Thanks to my kinesthesias, I have access to a near-sphere that is a major part of my “core-world” (*Kernwelt*). In and through- and around- this circle of nearness, places are constellated as nearby areas in/to which I can move. The near-sphere includes the approachability implied in the “I can” of kinaesthetic awareness. My own near-sphere is in effect the proximal place or places in which I

am or to which I *can go* (my far-sphere, in contrast, contains places to which I do not have immediate access.³⁹

The *near-sphere* not only fills the gap between body and place, but it is relevant also for the constitution of space since this does not arise from pure intuition but from concrete things to which we have access; “nearness” can be defined as what I can see in a small stretch of time, in a unitary comprehensive intuition and in a kinesthetic aspect relative to a unified consciousness.⁴⁰

The Husserlian notion of “nearness”, even if more theoretical, can be drawn near to the Heideggerian “closeness” which, however, presents an existential turn; Heidegger thinks of the human implacement in terms of “The Aroundness of the Environment and Dasein’s spatiality”: “closeness” represents, in his point of view, the most salient characteristic of the spatiality of the ready-to-hand in its familiarity:

Every entity that is ‘to hand’ has a different closeness, which is not to be ascertained by measuring distances. This closeness regulates itself in terms of circumspectively ‘calculative’ manipulating and using... When this closeness of the equipment has been given directionality, this signifies no merely that the equipment has its position (*Stelle*) in space as present-at-hand somewhere, but also that as equipment it has been essentially fitted up and installed, set up, and put to rights.⁴¹

The richness here of the notion of “closeness”, associated as it is with terms such as “familiarity”, “calculative manipulating” or “equipment”, marks its distance from the Husserlian concept of “nearness” which gets rid of the existential concreteness of the Heideggerian “closeness”.

The notion of “closeness” or that of “nearness” assume an even more important role in Heidegger’s very late writings: this relevance is indicated by the verbal proliferation of terms like the active gerund “naehernd” or noun forms like “nearhood” (*Nahheit*) and “nighness” (*Nahnis*). Thanks to nearness, the Open is not enclosed from without neither gathered as a region or located as a thing: it points much more to a *neighborhood*, that is, to the nearness of things and people who *coinhabit* a place in common.⁴²

It remains now to answer the question of what, in Husserl's point of view, makes possible the passage from the near-sphere to the objective space.

Spatiality, that is, objective space, is constituted through the *concatenation* of places available to me in my near-sphere; according to Casey, what we call "space" is not just the correlate, as it is for Claesges, of my kinesthetically felt near-sphere but its very *expansion*. In Husserl's point of view, the apperceptive expansion (*Erweiterung*) of the near-sphere is achieved in a homogeneous infinite open world of space:

This amounts to saying that the emptying and amalgamation of particular spaces, each of which is felt kinesthetically by the lived body, becomes in short order the planiform, absolute space of Newton. But that is possible only to the extent that places themselves depend on the lived body as the I-center or null-point, the "absolute here", of any given perceptual field.⁴³

The lived body, according to Husserl, is not itself *in* space as a physical object exists in space; it moves *through* space as "indirectly co-localized" in its movements:

My body- in particular, say, the bodily part "hand"-moves in space; [but] the activity of holding sway, "kinesthesia", which is embodied together with the body's movement, is not itself in space as a spatial movement but is only indirectly co-localized in that movement.⁴⁴

Only by virtue of this original experience of the bodily *holding-sway*, I am able to understand another physical body as a living body in which another "I" is embodied and holds sway.

If we believe that only natural sciences would capture the true nature of things, then, as a matter of fact, we are compelled to think that the *Lebenswelt* is merely subjective and relative, treating the world as if it could exist independently of any human accomplishment; Husserl opposes this view; it is because it does not justice to the *very subjectivity* which accomplishes science.

CHAPTER 3

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILFRID SELLARS

Summary

According to Richard Rorty, Sellars' philosophical enterprise has the merit of challenging the Kantian foundation of knowledge, since it aims at undermining the whole framework of *givenness* by adopting a form of holism founded on the idea that *justification* is not a matter of a special relation between ideas and objects, but of *conversation*, of *social practice*. In this sense, philosophy cannot no way maintain the role of a *metapractice* intended to criticize all the possible forms of social interplays; it searches no more for certainty. The behaviorist attitude is not a matter of "adequacy" since it aims at rejecting all those sorts of explanations founded on the reliability and authority of *first-person reports* about the world or the mind; more than this the issue of behaviorism is to inquire whether a practice of justification can be given a grounding in a fact.

Sellars' project can be seen as Kantian since he believes that the conceptual frameworks by virtue of which we encounter the world contain some synthetic a priori truths and are not deprived of a *prescriptive* or *normative* dimension. According to Sellars, to be a good philosopher is to cope with the *dialectical character* of philosophy itself, being disposed to put into question even the current conceptual framework. The courage to threaten well-accepted frameworks is demonstrated by Sellars through the demolition of the *myth of the Given*, that is, through the rejection of the idea that there would be an *exogenous* Given imposed *from the outside* on our system of beliefs.

Sellars' efforts are directed toward the development of a sort of "principle of comprehension" according to which nothing in the phenomenal field must be completely repudiated since even the scientific discourse is but a *continuation* and

refinement of the common sense framework; in this sense, Sellars' thought can be characterized as *naturalistic* even if not reductionist.

1. Rorty reads Sellars

According to Richard Rorty, philosophy since Descartes, has been dominated by *epistemology*; few philosophers took seriously the effort to stigmatize radically the notion of philosophy as *metacriticism* of special disciplines, proclaiming the unreality of the traditional epistemological problems and solutions.

"The spirit of playfulness" which connotes the philosophical enterprise at the beginning of the 1900, turned very early to a more serious way of doing philosophy, inspired by the force of the mathematical logic: Husserl and Russell are in this sense paradigmatic figures.

The discovery of "privileged representations"- called by Russell "logical forms" and by Husserl "essences"- can be seen as the last effort to rescue from the ancient philosophy the *quest for seriousness, purity and rigor*.

The Kantian picture of concepts and intuitions getting together to produce knowledge was not only rescued but also was used as the means to distinguish philosophy from psychology: philosophy, in this sense, stays to empirical science as the study of *structure* to the study of *content*.

Rorty's attempt in his famous work *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*⁴⁵ is to challenge this Kantian foundation reminding us of Sellars's behavioristic critique of the whole framework of the *givenness* and Quine's behavioristic approach to the *necessary-contingent distinction*.

Quine's and Sellars' way of thinking can be considered as a *form of holism* in that knowledge cannot be conceived of as an *accurate representing*- as the Mirror of Nature-, since such accuracy requires a theory of *privileged representations* which are automatically and intrinsically accurate.

Their holism would depend on the thesis that *justification* is not a matter of a special relation between ideas and objects, but of *conversation*, of *social practice*:

Conversational justification, so to speak, is naturally holistic, whereas the notion of justification embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and atomistic. ... The crucial premise of

this argument is that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation.⁴⁶

Conversation then replaces *confrontation* and the idea of the mind as mirror of the Nature can be dispelled; philosophy, in this view, cannot have the role of a *metapractice* defined to exercise the critique of all possible forms of social practice: philosophy is no more a quest for certainty.

Notwithstanding Sellars' holism, his writing, according to Rorty, would be still permeated with the notion of *analysis* and with a *tacit use* of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent, the structural and the empirical; Sellars *de facto* is not as distrustful of these distinctions as Quine: while the latter believes that the notion of meaning would involve commitment to *shady entities* which, then, are worthy of being abandoned, the former retains that meanings *per se* may well be vague, even if meaning talk is classificatory. If classifications were not vague, then we could not find a logical space for linguistic tokens like "tall", "short", "fat" and so on.

Willem DeVries argues this subject of matter as:

Sellars thus sees no need to call the very idea of the analytic-synthetic or the *a priori-a posteriori* distinctions into question, although his position implies that these distinctions are not the sharp-edged distinctions the logical positivists assumed they were.⁴⁷

Sellars, however, keeps the *analytic-synthetic* distinction separate from the *a priori-a posteriori* distinction, for the former distinction concerns *formal truth*, while the latter has to do with *material truths*; it is the notion of material truth which permits Sellars to define better his notion of the synthetic a priori: the good inferences in fact which are contained in the conceptual framework of an expression are not all the formal inferences: if the material rule of inference by virtue of which "x is colored" can be validly inferred from "x is red" is a good one, then the proposition "All red things are colored" can be seen as a synthetic a priori proposition.

Sellars, notwithstanding his endorsement of synthetic a priori propositions, cannot be considered a Kantian, for there is no need to believe that, like in Kant, there is

a single synthetic a priori proposition that is an element of all possible languages or conceptual frameworks.

De Vries gives further details on Sellars' endorsement:

In this respect, Sellars is more Hegelian than Kantian, for he recognizes that the synthetic *a priori* truths and even the set of categories we operate with are, potentially, dynamic, changing under the impact of both experience and reflection.⁴⁸

Rorty makes a point of the impossibility for analytic philosophy to be written without one or the other of these distinctions: for this reason, the analytic movement in the present stage, as an entrenched school of thought, would lack of *metaphilosophical reflection* and of *methodological self-consciousness*.

Quine and Sellars raise behaviorist questions about the epistemic status of assertions warranted by privileged assertions: for Sellars one point of interest lies in the reason we have, if we have, to distinguish between the authority of *first-person reports* and that of *expert reports*; the certainty of "I have a pain" would be then a reflection of the fact that nobody cares to question it, not conversely:

Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call 'epistemological behaviorism', an attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein.⁴⁹

If, however, we interpret epistemological behaviorism as a kind of *holism* according to which to understand the rules of language amounts to understand the way moves are made in that language⁵⁰, we must accept the premise that epistemic notions must be explicated only in behavioral terms, that is to say, remarks like "S knows that" must be interpreted as remarks about the status of S's reports among his peers and not as remarks mirroring the world.

If this premise is well accepted, then philosophy comes down to a *therapeutic tool* for straightening out quarrels between *common sense* and philosophy and nothing else.

According to this point of view, Sellars' account of first-person contemporary reports is grounded on the following conviction: to say that this kind of reports are

incorrigible is to say that “nobody has yet suggested a good way of predicting and controlling human behavior which does not take sincere first-person contemporary reports of thoughts at face-value”.

Behaviorist attitude is not only a matter of “adequacy”, but it claims simply that philosophy ought to offer common sense about knowledge and truth; it amounts to a rejection of a sort of explanation which tries to expound the reliability of reports about the world or the mind by using notions like “acquaintance with meanings” or “acquaintance with sensory data”.

If we are legitimated to postulate such abstract entities as helpful tools for entrenching our causal explanations, we cannot interpret them as premises from which to infer our knowledge of other entities:

What we *cannot* do is to take knowledge of these “inner” or “abstract” entities as *premises* from which our knowledge of other entities is normally inferred, and without which the latter knowledge would be “ungrounded”.⁵¹

This is a move which is attempted for the first time by Wittgenstein who dethrones the myth according to which rationality would consist in *a state of constraint under rules*. The Austrian philosopher makes a great work by dissolving the traditional *notion of analyticity*, by replacing the traditional term “coherence”, intended as a kind of “glue” which connects one element of the discourse with the other, with a colored linguistic context: the idea of *necessity*, then is destined to disappear.

Coherence, in the traditional debate, is conceived metaphorically as the force of a rope which goes through and links the steps and the phases of thought and language; in Wittgenstein’s point of view however, the force of a rope would consist much more in the fibre *interlacements*:

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family.

And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with several things that have

hitherto been called number; and this may be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things that we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties"—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of these fibres".⁵²

The issue of behaviorism in epistemology is not the adequacy or the explanation of a fact, but, much more that of inquiring whether a practice of justification can be given a grounding in a fact; this does not mean that knowledge is cut off from the world, but only that justification is a practice referred to what we already accept, so that we cannot "get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence"⁵³.

Sellars however cannot be defined a coherentist in the classical sense, since he does not maintain that all knowledge is inferential: perceptual and introspective reports, as a matter of fact, can be considered as instances of *noninferential knowledge*⁵⁴; according to the American philosopher, both the foundationalist and the coherentist positions conceal a position similar to that of "the myth of the Given" and they do so in linking together the notions of *noninferential* and *self-justifying*⁵⁵. He tries, on the contrary, to keep these notions distinct, formulating a theory in which noninferential knowledge doesn't amount to self-justifying knowledge.

There is no a "permanent neutral matrix" to regard some scientific or moral assumptions more rational than others; if we dispense with foundations or ontological grounds, then we implicitly admit that the only cultural criticism admitted is that which goes on *piecemeal* and *partial* without any referring to eternal standards.

Sellars' opposition to Platonism consists in his throwing back any attempt to measure the worth of every assertion and action by *recurring to the notion of correspondence instead of that of coherence*.

Rorty, however, affirms that Sellars cannot get along without appealing to a *residual form of Platonism*:

Unfortunately, both men tend to substitute correspondence to physical entities, and specifically to the ‘basic entities’ of physical science (elementary particles, or their successors).⁵⁶

As to the residual form of Platonism present in Sellars, it can be said that the American philosopher does not belong to those radical nay-sayers which not only deny much of the metaphysical architecture, dismissing it as mere non-sense, but they also reject the metaphysical project itself. Sellars, on the contrary, aims at constructing a metaphysics in which you can find some truths which have not the form of evidences (as in Descartes), but that of *complexes* in which competing insights balance reciprocally in several different dimensions:

Classical rationalism... made explicit the grammar of epistemological and metaphysical predicates, but- owing to certain confusions, particularly with respect to *meaning* and *existence*-came to the mistaken conclusion that philosophical statements were factual statements, albeit of a particular kind. Classical empiricism, on the other hand, argued that these statements were common or garden variety factual statements, and usually put them in the psychological species. Rationalism gave the grammar, but contaminated it with platonizing factualism. Classical empiricism threw out the platonizing, but continued to factualize, and confused the grammar of the philosophical predicates by attempting to identify them with psychological predicates....⁵⁷

The importance of Quine’s and Sellars’ enterprise would lie in their declining every attempt to reduce norms, rules, justifications to facts, generalizations and explanations; this strategy has a positive outcome insofar as they do not want to offer any account to be tested for *adequacy*: the idea, that is to say, of an account of human knowledge is futile.

According to them, rationality of science is not due to the fact that it has a *foundation* (Sellars) or it has an *architectonic structure* (Quine): science is for the first a “self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once”⁵⁸, while for the second it resembles a *field of force* in which there are no assertions immune from revision.

Sellars’ project, in particular, can be seen as a Kantian response to the dominant empiricism of the XX century; the manifest and the scientific images are, as a matter of fact, *transcendentally ideal* frameworks because they are human constructs; to put it in other words, any conceptual framework determine some

synthetic a priori truths, including valid forms of material inference, even if there is no set of absolute truths.

Every conceptual framework has necessarily a *prescriptive* or *normative* dimension: they are in fact constituted by valid inferences, formal and material, and by the responses and behaviors that are permitted by them.

Science itself, contain methods which consist also of prescriptive claims; according to Sellars however, the prescriptive dimension of science is not complete, insofar scientists do not deal with questions, such as the legitimacy of some scientific investigations.

In this sense, science, even if promoting our *epistemic welfare*, can contribute to the broader intersubjective intention to promote our welfare unconditionally⁵⁹.

Science thus can have practical relevance or reality, even if it is the manifest image that retains *practical priority* over the scientific: the scientific image raises in fact practical issues it is not in a position to answer:

The practical reality of scientific objects, *as such*, however, is extrinsic to them. Their practical reality is not intrinsic to them, for it is not, for instance, tied in to their identity and individuation conditions⁶⁰.

The most important point however in Sellars' account of science is the claim that no theory of representation provides a good explanation of how science goes on: that is, no account of nature can rely on a theory of representations which stand in privileged relations to reality.

To better appreciate this matter of fact, we need to reflect upon Sellars' account of the *nature* of scientific laws.

Sellars' account of scientific laws can be seen as *mediation* and *synthesis* of what he considers as positive insights contained in the empiricist and the rationalist poles⁶¹: putting it in other words, the empiricist is right in claiming that the world contains only constant conjunctions of events (there is no place for causal power), but, on the other hand, the rationalist is right in claiming that the *language* of causal necessity is an irreducible element of rational discourse about the world, even if P-entailments have no descriptive significance.

Sellars' account of the role of causal necessity is similar to that regarding the role of observation basis: they have both a *methodological* significance.

The American philosopher then regards laws as *material rules of inference*, that is, as rules that permit us to move from statement X to statement Y where X and Y are *nonlogical* terms: a law like "water boils at 212° F" can be rendered by "from 'x is water' infer 'x boils at 212° F'".

Gary Gutting writes:

The most immediate motivation for regarding laws as material rules of inference is to desire to implement the ideate that necessity of laws does not correspond to an ontological fact but rather to a methodological directive. If laws are rules of inference, then their direct function is to tell us what we ought to do, not what is the case. (This construal paves the way for Sellars' own version of a pragmatic "vindication" of induction...).⁶²

This interpretation of the nature of scientific laws is tied intimately to Sellars' theory of meaning and to his rejection of the epistemological given; Sellars, in particular, makes clear that there is no such thing as *pre-linguistic awareness* which would provide the special sort of certainty associated with the visual perception:

*All awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts etc., in short all awareness of abstract entities- indeed, all awareness of particulars- is a linguistic affair.*⁶³

Awareness intended as being in the *logical space of reasons* and not as a *discriminative behavior is justified true belief*: the ability then to respond to stimuli (discriminative behavior) is a *causal condition* for knowledge but not a *ground* for knowledge; moreover, the empiricist account of knowledge according to which concepts and particulars are temporally prior to any propositional knowledge is, on the basis of the above view, misguided.

If, however, there is no such thing as a justified belief which is not propositional, how pre-linguistic children can be said to know i.e. what red is in a sense different from the color discrimination of, say, a photoelectric cell?

Sellars introduces to solve this problem the distinction between “knowing what X is like” and “knowing what sort of thing an X is” ; children see or, more general, feel the same thing (a red ball, e.g.) before and after language-learning:

Before language, he is said to *know* the thing he feels just in case it is the sort of thing which in later life he will be able to make noninferential reports about.⁶⁴

Children are then different from photoelectric cells for they have this “latent ability” which will be developed when they will grasp the relevant vocabulary, for, according to Sellars, *to have a concept is to use a word* and, more particularly, *we cannot have a concept without having many*.

The distinctions made above supply the theoretical ground to overtake the obstacles created by the *myth of the Given* since, according to this myth, there is a connection, a grounding relation, between *knowing what* something is like and *knowing that* sort of thing something is.

In Sellars’ point of view, language does not produce “inner” changes, but let us enter a community in which assertions can be justified and so legitimated :one thing is to explain the *acquisition* of language, another thing, very different from the former, is to understand the *justification* of human knowledge which rests on a *social practice*:

Once again, Sellars falls back on saying that justification is a matter of social practice, and that everything which is not a matter of social practice is no help in understanding the *justification* of human knowledge, no matter how helpful it may be in understanding its *acquisition* .⁶⁵

Summarizing: the greater mistake made by the epistemological tradition was to confuse the *causal process* of acquiring knowledge with questions regarding its *justification*: in this perspective, Sellars’ commitment to philosophy is similar to Wittgenstein’s effort in the *Investigations*: it is, ultimately, the “natural corollary” of the *Tractatus*’s separation between *fact-stating* assertions and others uses of language (ethical, religious, aesthetical and so on).

In other words, Sellars’ attempt is to turn *outward* what the philosophical tradition has turned *inward* , regarding knowledge as depending on social context rather than on relations between inner representations seen as the *touchstone* of truth.

2. Sellars' theory of knowledge

Before touching some issues about Sellars' conception of knowledge, it is worth giving briefly Sellars' view of the role of philosophy among the disciplines of the intellect. Sellars tries, from the very beginning of his philosophical enterprise, to *balance* competing insights which constitute the epistemological domain: empiricism, rationalism, foundationalism, coherentism, externalism, internalism, realism, phenomenism, idealism.

In this sense, Sellars' philosophical discourse can be seen as an attempt to maintain a *central position* with respect to all the above mentioned insights, preserving the best results or fruits of every position; we can, however, retain a central position only by acknowledging the most important pair of *opposing pitfalls*: the *coherentism* that rejects any rational external constraint and the *myth of the Given* which offers "exculpations" where what we need is "justifications"⁶⁶. Only by stopping oscillation between these pitfalls, we may arrive at a consideration of empirical knowledge as a *co-operation* between sensibility and understanding; according to John McDowell, one way of disposing of these pitfalls would consist in assuming that *understanding is already implicated in the deliverances of sensibility*:

Experiences are impressions made by the world on our senses, products of receptivity; but those impressions themselves already have conceptual content.⁶⁷

Sellars supports the above position by denying that there would be a *basic level* at which knowledge is a matter of an immediate encounter with its object, as if this immediate knowledge were not inferred from any other knowledge.

According to the most American philosopher, to defend the notion of Given would mean to affirm that there is a difference between *inferring* that something is the case and *seeing* it to be the case,⁶⁸ it is however remarkable to note that the word "Given" is intended by Sellars as a piece of *professional-epistemological talk*, which carries with it a substantial theoretical commitment.

At the core of sense-datum theories there is a distinction between an *act of awareness* and the *object of this act*: acts moreover are often characterized as “phenomenologically simple” that is to say, not further analyzable.

Sense-datum theorists, in this point of view, argue that in perception we are not directly related to physical objects, but to sense data which, in some way, would *mirror* the ontological status of the real objects.

The major point of Sellars’ view is the idea that numerous *tensions* are hidden in sense-datum theories that can be characterized in these terms:

- 1) knowledge of *facts* versus knowledge of *particulars*;
- 2) *learned* versus *unlearned* cognitive capacities;
- 3) *factualism* about knowledge versus *non-naturalism* about knowledge;
- 4) inner episodes as *causal intermediaries* of empirical knowledge versus inner episodes as *epistemic intermediaries* of empirical knowledge.

Sellars fashions an account of sensation which construes this both *instrumentally* and *nonepistemically*: sensations are neither the direct objects of knowledge, nor are they primordial knowings; they would belong to the *causal order* rather than to the cognitive one .

Sensations do *mediate* and *guide* our perceptual knowledge of the world, even if this knowledge is not a “second-class knowing” inferred from the knowledge of items like color and sounds: our knowledge of the world is *direct but mediated*.

For this reason sensations cannot be considered like knowings: they are *states of perceivers* that are nonepistemic in character and depending on external causes; sensations are a necessary condition of the *intentional order*, even if they do not belong to this order.

Sellars does not accept Ryle’s talk of “category mistake”, for he retains that not only inner episodes are not category mistakes, but they are quite “effable” in intersubjective discourse ; according to Sellars, as a matter of fact, the concepts of sense impressions must be:

Primarily and essentially *inter-subjective*, without being resolvable into overt behavioral symptoms, and that the reporting role of these concepts, their role in introspection, the fact that each of us has a privileged access to his impressions, constitutes a dimension of these concepts which is *built on* and *presupposes* their role in intersubjective discourse. It also makes clear why

the “privacy” of these episodes is not the “absolute privacy” of the traditional puzzles. For, as in the case of thoughts, the fact that overt behavior is evidence for these episodes is built into the very logic of these concepts.⁶⁹

Sellars, to some extent, warns against confusing the creative enrichment, made possible by the language of impressions, of the framework of the empirical knowledge with an analysis of knowledge in itself: to put it in other words, the *normative character* of knowledge cannot be confused with the *factual character* of the same; in some sense, the language of impressions is an *act of believing* and *deciding*, a *construing* of data and the Given in the sense of a *taking imposition*:

He [Jones] construes as *data* the particulars and arrays of particulars which he has come to be able to observe, and believes them to be antecedent objects of knowledge which have somehow been in the framework from the beginning. It is in the very act of *taking* that he speaks of the *given*.⁷⁰

As argued by Robert Brandom, our concepts of things cannot depend on the fact that we have first observed them, for, in observing things, we must presuppose in some way the concept of these.

To notice something amounts then, in epistemically terms, to answer to its presence by applying a concept in a non inferential judgment: I am aware of “red things” only if I possess the concept “red”; if we lack then the concept “red” we cannot observe or we cannot be aware of red things, even if we can respond discriminately to them.

Unfortunately, according to Brandom, Sellars does not make clear explicitly his attitude toward empiricism and this would depend on the difficulty to establish if he is giving his thesis or he is laying out thesis of other scholars.

Sellars, to some extent, shares the idea of the empiricists according to which the capacity of having classificatory beliefs of the form “x is F” is acquired, even if he does not accept the idea that the formation of concepts and the warranty of their non inferential application would depend on the existence of non verbal and non conceptual inner episodes.

At this point of the analysis, therefore, it arises the question if we can break out of our creative language and discourse to an archè beyond language and discourse; if every given is an act of taking, that is, something tied to our activities and, more generally, to our subjectivity, it emerges the question if we can climb over the boundary constituted by our languages toward the comprehension of a given intended in its autonomy; we cannot thus assimilate sensations to the intentional order, even if we are allowed to state that, in some way, these states of the perceiver are related to the cognitive order.

In Sellars' opinion, we are tempted to see sensations as epistemic firstly because there is a *grammatical similarity* between the language of sensations ("a sensation of a green and round thing") and the language we adopt to refer to and characterize items of the cognitive order ("a thought of a green and round thing"); secondly, from a logical point of view, "there is a sensation of a green and round thing" fails to entail "there is a green and round thing" just as "there is a thought of a pink elephant" fails to entail "there is a pink elephant".

It is also important to note that the use of *analogy* between sensations and physical things can be very dangerous: we can, for instance, introduce sensations of red triangles or sensations of green balls by analogy to red triangles and black blackboards, but we cannot make the same thing about sensations of pain or pleasure: these sensations, in fact, are not inner replicas of any physical objects.

We cannot neglect also the fact that the problem concerning sensations is tied, in Sellars, to how we can "define" a person: persons are individuals that have perceptible characteristics and behave in perceptible ways; the behavior concerns, first of all, the use of language intended as a "thinking-out-loud" and the meaningfulness of which is to be found in the *coherence* exhibits not only within it, but also in its relation to the contexts in which it occurs.

However, this "austere conception" of the person can be extended and, more particularly, enriched by introducing the notion of "sensing":

Thus sensings were introduced as theoretical states involved in the explanation, for example, of how it could seem to a person that there is a pink ice cube in front of him when in point of fact there is not. In both the veridical perception of a pink ice cube and a perceptual experience which would be veridical if there were such a object in front of one, the person senses a-pink-cubely, or, in more familiar terms, has a sensation of a pink cube (where 'of a pink cube' is to be construed

depth-grammar-wise as an adjective) so that the expression might be parse ‘an of-a-pink-cube sensation’⁷¹.

Persons, according to Sellars, are basic objects for which a *value-free description* is meaningless: they have a *normativity* which is natural and intrinsic; in the manifest image then, the practical reality of persons is *foundational*: whereas persons possess intrinsic values, objects have value only in relation to persons; secondly, persons have states and behaviors which have value.

It comes into being also the problem of matching this analysis of persons with the conception that science ought to be considered as the measure of what is that it is and what is not that it is not, for, from an empirical point of view, persons are *dependent objects*, complexes of objects posited by science.

Persons, however, are not artifacts, even if they, together with their attendant properties (such as intentional states), bear some analogies with artifacts; beliefs or intentions, in Sellars’ theory of intentionality are *functional states* in that every attribution of intentionality to a human subject requires that the subject of the intentional state participates in a complete, *intersubjective community*; this functionality is all that counts to the concept of intentionality which is built on a background of *rule-governed* practices and institutions.

This does not mean that persons and their intentions are demoted by Sellars to mere illusions, lacking of ontological reality; they, as a matter of fact, are phenomena available only to a particular point of view: “The point of view of a self-conscious, rational, logic-using agent who is a member of a community that is, individually and collectively, engaged in pursuing various ends in a world it did not make”.⁷²

3. *Perceiving as thinking*

Sellars regards knowledge as belonging in a *normative context* so that when we characterize an episode as that of knowing, we do not give an empirical description of that episode or state: we are placing it in the *logical space of reasons* where only justifications count.

If, as a matter of fact, the normative context in which knowledge is shaped is neglected, epistemology is liable to fall into a *naturalistic fallacy* as pointed out by John McDowell:

Sellars separates concepts that are intelligible only in terms of how they serve to place things in the logical space of reasons, such as the concept of knowledge, from concepts that can be employed in ‘empirical description’. And if we read the remark as a warning against a naturalistic fallacy, we are understanding “empirical description” as placing things in the logical space of nature, to coin a phrase that is Sellarsian at least in spirit⁷³.

Epistemology ought to avoid the impasses of *representationalism* and *phenomenalism*, affirming that the objects of basic knowings are physical objects and that there is no more basic form of knowledge than perceiving physical objects.

To investigate this matter further, we ought to be certain about the structure of perceptual experience; first of all, we must admit that perceiving essentially involves thinking: perceiving therefore presupposes *a knowledge of general truths about material things*.

To comprehend this point better, we ought to admit that ontology cannot be severed from epistemology “as with a knife”:⁷⁴ according to Sellars, as a matter of fact, attributions of objectual knowledge amount to attributions of generalized propositional knowledge and even of *know-how* knowledge: if “George knows Rome”, then “George knows how to get around in the city” where things are so and so.

Knowledge of particulars thus cannot itself be the *independent foundation* of all propositional knowledge; propositional knowledge itself depends *causally* on the *know-how* we manifest in making *material inferences*: at this point we find Sellars’ pragmatist strain.

Nevertheless, perceiving is not *merely* thinking: there is a *descriptive core* of seeing, e.g. a seen yellow square distinguishes itself from merely thinking about a yellow square; we have to sort out then a *propositional component* and a *descriptive core*.

In Sellars' view however, *perception is more than merely sensing* and, for this reason, can be characterized as an awareness of a *this-such*; seeing something as yellow is a conceptual process which is the slow building up of a *multi-dimensional pattern* of linguistic responses.

Experience is a matter of *identifying* individuals as *instances of a kind* and, for this reason, is literally a thinking involving a propositional component which cannot be reduced to a limited number of kind concepts, because it presupposes a *whole battery* of concepts.

This way of interpreting our perceptual awareness of any fact corresponds to our understanding of the way thinking goes on: *not in bit and pieces*.

What said above has much to do with Sellars' conception of philosophy: to understand the way we think or perceive, we have to "stumble on the familiar" and to feel a "haunting sense of alienation", trying to become *reflectively at home* in the full complexity of the multi-dimensional conceptual system in terms of which we suffer, think, and act. We must begin by constructing simple *models* of fragments of this multidimensional patterns even if we cannot be never satisfied with them for the reason that they can be connected with other systems:

And, indeed, the ultimate justification for system building in philosophy is the fact that no model for any region of discourse-perceptual, discursive, practical, can be ultimately satisfying unless its connection with each of the others is itself modeled.⁷⁵

To stress this idea amounts to reject a characteristic form of the Myth of the Given according to which there must be a structure of a particular matter of fact such that: i) each fact can be *non-inferentially* known to be the case ii) and this noninferential knowledge would constitute the ultimate *court of appeals* for all factual claims.

The idea of a privileged stratum of fact rests on the familiar assumption that knowledge, at this level, ought to be noninferential, ultimate and provided with *authority*; this amounts to say that the statements concerning this level, must involve a kind of *credibility* without which they cannot rise to the dignity of knowledge. The kind of credibility which gets into these statements would not

depend on the credibility of other statements: there seems to be a class of statements which fill some of these requirements, statements which report observations such as “This is green”.

These statements are made as to “involve those so called token-reflexive expressions which, in addition to the tenses of verbs, serve to connect the circumstances in which a statement is made with its sense”.⁷⁶

Anyway, it seems that a sentence token, whether it contains a token-reflexive expression or not, can acquire credibility in two ways:

- (a) *inherited* from a type authority as in the case of tokens of a sentence type like ‘ $2+2=4$ ’ ;
- (b) *gained* by the fact that credibility arouse in a certain set of circumstances as in sentences like “ This is green”.

Since no empirical sentence type appears to have intrinsic credibility, this means that credibility must accrue to some empirical sentence types by virtue of their logical relations to certain sentence tokens the authority of which is not derived from the authority of sentence types:

The picture we get is that of their being two ultimate modes of credibility: (1) The intrinsic credibility of analytic sentences, which accrues to tokens as being tokens of such a type; (2) the credibility of such tokens as ‘express observations’, a credibility which flows from tokens to type.⁷⁷

The second mode of credibility commits one to believe that the authority of the observation reports, also *Konstatierungen*, would rest on non verbal episodes of awareness which have an intrinsic authority:

One is committed to a stratum of authoritative nonverbal episodes (‘awareness’), the authority of which accrues to a superstructure of verbal actions, provided that the expressions occurring in these actions are properly used .⁷⁸

To surmount the perplexities bound to the empiricist view, we must begin to assume, firstly, that a report can be correct “as being an instance of a general

mode of behavior which, in a given linguistic community, it is reasonable to sanction and to support”⁷⁹; secondly, that the authority of a report must be *recognized* by the person whose report it is.

According to this view then, to make an observation report expressed by a token like “This is yellow” does not amount to follow the uniform behavior of a thermometer.

4. Sellars on reductionism

The questions discussed hitherto make a point of another important issue treated by Sellars in an original way: *how to approach reductionism*.

According to Sellars, a principle of *object reduction* can be stated in the following way:

If an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then every property of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and stand in such and such relations or, roughly, every property of a system of objects consists of properties of, and relations between, its constituents.⁸⁰

This is clearly and explicitly a principle of *object reduction* for: if an object has a property that does not consist of properties of and relations between its constituents, then that thing cannot be reduced within that framework: a person, for example, is a complex object and has constituents, but it is irreducible because not all of its properties consist in facts about its constituents, qualities and relations; a person is, in that framework, a *basic object*.

The principle of reduction nevertheless cannot be applied to colors of physical objects in the Manifest Image for the assumption that the micro-physical particles constituting the object ought to be colored makes no sense.

Being Sellars’ principle of reduction grounded on the criterion of *property reduction*, it is reasonable to think that manifest physical objects cannot be reduced to systems of microphysical objects, since the former have proper

sensible properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of the systems of microparticles.

Sellars distinguishes between an *intra-theoretic* property reduction and an *inter-theoretic* property reduction; in the case of the chemical theory and the micro-physical theory, he states that the current predicates and primitives of both theories are to be considered as *predecessors* of concepts in an *encompassing theory* in which there can be found an adequate *definitional relation* between the two different theoretical kind of predicates.

What about raw feel predicates?

It seems that any reduction must be dismissed, since raw feel predicates especially are untheoretical, but, according to Sellars, this is false for raw-feel predicates can be construed as theoretical:

...if both raw-feel and brain-state predicates are theoretical predicates, can we not conceive of a reduction of raw-feel theory to brain-state theory?⁸¹

Raw-feel predicates can be also, according to Sellars, primitive predicates in a *unified theory*, because they remain non definable in this theory; but, to avoid misunderstanding, it is important to remark that undefined predicates are not for this reason meaningless, for their meaning depends on the role they play in *language-entry*, *language-exit* and *intralinguistic transitions*⁸².

Returning to the question of reducibility, Sellars affirms that in a *to be* achieved sense-impression- brain-state theory, the logical space of sense-impressions shall be “transposed into a new key and located in a new context”⁸³, avoiding every possibility of reduction.

The non reductive alternative is preferable for Sellars, since he thinks that the set of primitives necessary to scientific explanation and description of non living-objects *are not adequate* to describe and explain sentience organisms: a proper explanation of sentience organism may introduce new entities that are not called in the explanation of the behavior of non-sentient objects.

According to Sellars, proper sensible, i.e. colors, odors, must receive a *special ontological treatment* in an ultimately satisfactory scientific theory: this argument has been dubbed the “grain argument” which can be divided in two stages:

1. Colors (odors and the like) cannot be really properties of physical objects *per se*; are then they modifications of mind?
2. Proper sensibles cannot be reduced to modifications of brain qua system of micro-particles.

As noticed by deVries this argument leaves us with a stark choice:

...either the proper sensibles are (modifications of) immaterial or nonphysical things, or they are so totally illusory that nothing in the world explains them, or we have to provide for them in the scientific picture of the world, for example, recognize in the ultimate scientific image basic particulars to which the sensible predicates directly apply.⁸⁴

According to Richardson and Muhlenberg⁸⁵ Sellars, in the long run, would not press for irreducibility; instead of it, he would appreciate an argument *designed to accomodate* sense impressions within a reductionist program.

In doing so, Sellars would make use of successive *approximations* and *revisions*, starting e.g. from an Aristotelian conception of persons as single logical subjects to arrive at a *final sophistication* according to which persons are complexes standing in relations to other complexes: persons, in this last image, sense even if their sensings are reducible states.

Even regarding Sellars as a reductionist, it does not mean that he would acknowledge the truth of the following statement: *manifest objects are identical with the systems of imperceptible particles countenanced by micro-theory*.

After having distinguished between *structural properties*, which are unproblematically reducible as a ladder and its constituents (rungs, frame and so on), and *content properties*, a red brick wall every constituent of which (brick) has the property redness, we can say that Sellars' point is to claim that manifest objects *cannot be construed as having structural properties*.

However, it seems plausible to say that the first step of Sellars' account of reductionism would be the rejection of the view which considers manifest and

scientific images as *consistent systems operating at distinct levels of analysis*: science, according to this thesis, would provide a superior account of the world.

The American philosopher, distinguishing between ontological and methodological arguments, denies that sciences have right to an *epistemological primacy* for the reason that they are dependent upon the framework of *common sense* for observations.⁸⁶

Sellars' acknowledgment of the superiority of the scientific image would depend, as it were, only on its *greater degree of explanatory coherence* a formulation of which might be termed, according to Richardson and Muhlenberg, an "inter-framework decision procedure":

In crude fashion, that framework which serves to most adequately describe and explain the phenomena concerned (i.e., the observable behavior of objects and persons, particularly the perceptual functioning of sentient organism) is the framework which must finally be taken the measure of what is real.⁸⁷

Explanatory coherence is a *multidimensional maximizing* of the integration of theoretical principles and the accuracy of prediction.

The weak point of Sellars' position seems to be the lacking of a criterion according to which we can judge a framework better than another, since there may be many successful ways of describing and explaining the world resting on different *purposes* and *ends*.

According to Richardson and Muhlenberg on the other hand, by using the notion of alternative modes of reconstruction or revision of conceptual frameworks, we could acquire a good criterion for choosing between contrasting alternatives; the criterion required would be: given two or more alternative modes of reconstruction or revision, that alternative is best which (a) is the *simplest* and (b) *maximizes* explanatory coherence.

Sellars seems interested, following Charles Peirce, in an *ultimate* normal science, that is, in a science as it will be in the future when all the facts are in; the American philosopher has the expectation that the ultimate scientific image of man will be *deterministic*, even if he recognizes that, in the present state of

science, it is *not reasonable* to held a deterministic position. At any sense, he wouldn't be so happy to abandon his belief in free will with a sense of liberation.

5. *The myth of the Given*

By rejecting the framework of traditional empiricism, Sellars don't stress the fact that empirical knowledge has no foundation, since there is some point to the picture of human knowledge as resting on a special kind of knowledge (e.g self-authenticating reports); however, the metaphor of foundation is misleading:

... in that it keeps us from seeing that there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former⁸⁸.

The rationality of empirical knowledge doesn't depend on the fact that it has a foundation, but much more on the fact that it is a *self-correcting enterprise*, questioning any claim, though not all at once.

Sellars' most important contribution to the demolition of the myth of the Given consists in his rejecting, as for Hegel, the idea of an *exogenous* Given and claiming that the Given is not something imposed from *outside* the activity of adjusting the system of our beliefs.

John McDowell underlines this point:

We must think of empirical rationality in a dynamic way, in terms of a continuing adjustment to the impact of experience. To reject the idea of an exogenous Given is to follow this prescription in part. It is to refuse to conceive experience's demands on a system of beliefs as imposed from outside the activity of adjusting the system, by something constituted independently of the current state of the evolving system, or a state into which the system might evolve. The required adjustments to the system depend on what we take experience to reveal to us, and we can capture that only in terms of the concepts and conceptions that figure in the evolving system. What we take experience to tell us is already part of the system, not an external constraint on it⁸⁹.

To paraphrase what is said above, we can appeal to the idea that conceptual capacities are *passively operative* in experience: a judgment that something is yellow is an exercise of spontaneity, although it needs, as any judging, a right

contribution of passive experience. According to McDowell, this would be the same as assuming that i.e. concepts of ,say, colors are only *minimally* integrated into the active business of accomodating one's thinking to the deliverances of experience, even if no color judgment can be uttered unless it fit into some view of the world, being equipped with such things as the concept of visible surfaces of objects or the concept of *suitable conditions* for telling what something's color is by looking at it: it is this kind of integration which enables experience to pass a scrutiny of its rational credentials. For this reason, concepts like *being red* and *looking red* are intelligible only on terms of each other as elements in a *bundle of concepts* that must be acquired together; only adopting this approach, we can make out that the *space of reasons* is more extensive than the conceptual realm so as to incorporate *extraconceptual impingements* from the outer world. The idea of the Given, according to McDowell, would offer "exculpations" for the outer influence of the world, whereas we would need "justifications":

But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In effect, the idea of the given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications⁹⁰.

To better understand what is above discussed, we could attempt to think about a color concept: when this kind of concept is drawn into operation in an experience, the content of the latter is shaped by the conceptual linkages of the former; by virtue of this integration in a *whole network*, the understanding of the experience by the subject contains a wider reality, embraceable in thought, than those brought out by the very same experience:

Even in the case of colour experience, this integration allows us to understand an experience as awareness of something independent of the experience itself: something that is held in place by its linkage into the wider reality, so that we can make sense of the thought that it would be so even if it were not being experienced to be so.⁹¹

What philosophers as Sellars or McDowell see as the greatest contribution of Wittgenstein's thought is the idea that *thinking does not stop short of facts*; this means that the conceptual distinction *inward/outward* does not work:

What is in question could not be the thinkable world, or, to put it another way, our picture of the understanding's equipment could not be what it needs to be, a picture of a system of concepts and conceptions with substantial empirical content, if it were not already part of the picture that the system is the medium within which one engages in active thought that is rationally responsive to the deliverances of experience.⁹²

We ought to abandon thus the picture according to which there would be an outer boundary around the sphere of the conceptual which would *impinge inwardly* the system.

This rejection is justified by the idea that this kind of boundary crossing would be *a causal fact and not a rational*: the impressions which impinge on our conceptual system and keep it in motion are already *equipped with* conceptual content.

However, the arguments presented by Sellars' *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* would not show, according to some scholars, that the Given is simply a myth.⁹³

A good philosophical move then would be to delete the idea of an outer boundary without falling into idealism, slighting in this way the independence of reality.

6. Philosophy as a practical enterprise

According to Sellars, the historical development of philosophy can be considered as the periodic formulation of *new* questions rather than as a *series of answers* to the same problems like *variations on the theme* in music.

Consequently, a philosophical system "dies" when the questions it attempts to answer are no longer asked; there is also another conception of philosophy according to which philosophy would give obvious answers, once questions are properly formulated:

It suggests that the evolution of philosophical thought is accurately conceived neither as a series of different answers to the same questions, nor as a series of different sets of questions, but rather as the series of approximations by which philosophers move toward the discovery of the very questions they have been trying to answer all the time.⁹⁴

A genuine advance of philosophy would consist then in the replacement of a *confused question* by a less confused one; in Sellars' point of view, a philosophical theory can be attacked in two ways: *reducing it to absurdity* or *tracing errors back to their roots*; he prefers the latter method because it is capable of bringing definitive results, while the former would leave the root confusion untouched:

A mistaken theory can be compared to a symptom of a disease. By the use of inadequate medicaments one can often 'cure' the symptoms while leaving the disease untouched.⁹⁵

Thence philosophers can be seen to leap from the frying-pan of one absurdity into the fire of another one, incapable of breaking into this *vicious circle*.

Sellars' philosophical perspectives are guided by the metaphysical conviction that the distinguishing mark of real things is the power to act or be acted upon;⁹⁶ this line of thought leads to a *thoroughgoing naturalism* that, remaining true to the "synoptic view", acknowledges, for instance the relevance of the mind without assigning an ontological status to intentional entities.

Sellars' naturalism then is intimately connected with the idea that the aim of philosophy is a *practical* one, a form of *know-how* whose success is measured by the reflective realization of the philosophical paradigm of *knowing one's way around*.

In this sense, to be a *good philosopher* would amount to face the *dialectical character* of philosophy itself, being disposed to put into question even the current conceptual framework: philosophy, in this sense, turns out to be not a *once-and-for-all* vision of humanity-in-the-world, since the way we fit into the world is *not static*; consequently, the achievement of a unitary vision of the world would resemble a Kantian *regulative ideal*.

The task of the philosopher does not consist in giving analysis in the sense of definitions for, according to Sellars, the *atomistic conception of philosophy*, that is, the idea that each philosopher fences himself off in his own philosophical garden, is an illusion: analysis, nowadays, means more than the *clarification of the logical structures of a multidimensional discourse*:

...discourse not longer appears as one plane parallel to another, but as a tangle of intersecting dimensions whose relations with one another and with extra-linguistic fact conform to non single or simple pattern.⁹⁷

Distinguishing then the “journeyman tactics” from the “grand strategy”, Sellars retains that only the latter, if taken by philosophy, can be directed toward an articulated and integrated vision of man-in-the-universe, that is, toward a *discourse-about-man-in-all-discourses*.

Modern philosophy shows interest in two conceptions of man-in-the-world, the *manifest* and the *scientific*, so that it cannot avoid the attempt to see “how they fall together in one stereoscopic view”; these two images represent two pictures of the same order of complexity which the philosopher ought *to fuse into one vision*.

7. Naturalism

Sellars’ commitment to naturalism, it has been said, seems very problematic, since he does not support the hard reductionism which in the last decades accompanies every naturalistic philosophical project: the kind of naturalism supported by the American philosopher can be expressed, according to him, in this way:

As for Naturalism. That, too, had negative overtones at home. It was as wishy-washy and ambiguous as Pragmatismus. One could believe almost anything about the world and even some things about God, and yet be a Naturalist. What was needed was a new, nonreductive materialism. My father could call himself a Materialist in all good conscience, for at that time he was about the only one in sight. I, however, do not own the term, and I am so surprised by some of the views of the new, new Materialists, that until the dust settles, I prefer the term ‘Naturalism’ which, while retaining its methodological connotations, has acquired a substantive content, which, if it does not entail scientific realism, is at least not incompatible with it.⁹⁸

To appreciate what Sellars intend by the term “Naturalism”, we have to stress his dislike for every form of reductionism: at the end of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, Sellars points out that by confronting the manifest image of world

with the scientific image, we feel us compelled to choice between the following alternatives:

- i) a *dualism* in which men as scientific objects are contrasted with “minds” which are persons’ attributes;
- ii) a *monism* according to which we must accept the exclusive reality of scientific objects;
- iii) a thesis according to which the status of theoretical frameworks is “calculational” or “auxiliary” in the sense that they serve or are subjected to the *primacy of the manifest image*.

Sellars retains that none of these alternatives can be considered satisfactory and, believing this, he defends a philosophical approach that can be interpreted as nonreductionist; in his point of view, in fact, determinism itself is not among the conclusions of scientific inquiry, unless we intend it as part of a conceptual framework, i.e., the scientific image of man; following Charles Peirce, he has expectation that the ultimate scientific image of man in the world will be deterministic, even if he recognizes that, assumed the present state of science, contrary expectations can be reasonably held.

He rejects a *Spinozistic view* of the relation between the manifest image and the scientific one according to which the first would be false, while the second must be maintained; Sellars, as a matter of fact, aims at describing how the two images blend together.

This position falls on in his philosophy of mind in which he, unlike Ryle, treats a large part of our mentalistic vocabulary as being *explanatory* as well as *descriptive*: by uttering the sentence “it is raining”, a man expresses, by way of this utterance, not only a proposition about the weather, but also an *act of thought*; moreover, this performed act of thought is normally part of the *causal explanation* of why the man uttered that sentence.

What said above is part of Sellars’ antireductionist effort not merely *to reconcile* the conceptual framework of persons with the scientific image, but much more *to join* the former to the latter, enriching the scientific image with the language of community and individual intentions and making the world, as conceived by scientific theory, the world in which we live, even if the incorporation of the former into the latter is, for the present, realized only in imagination.

Sellars advocates scientific realism insofar *science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not*⁹⁹, but, in doing so, he is careful to distinguish between *ontological priority* (science) and *methodological* or *epistemological priority* (observational framework of common sense). The ontological priority is attributed to science for it would provide us with a *greater degree of explanatory coherence*; put in other words, the framework which more adequately describes and explains phenomena, ought to be taken as the measure of what is real.

Once we admit what said above, we are however not committed to reject *in extenso* the common sense framework since a proposition formulated in this *Weltanschauung* cannot be questioned by, for example, an empirical proposition pertaining to the scientific domain: a case study that bears out this thesis is the claim that the sentence “physical objects have colors” would express an empirical proposition which, even if believed by common sense, has been shown by science to be false.

Sellars explicates his ideas as follows:

The idea that physical objects are not coloured can make sense only as the (misleading) expression of one aspect of a philosophical critique of the very framework of physical objects located in Space and enduring through Time. In short, ‘Physical objects are not really coloured’ makes sense only as a clumsy expression of the idea that there are no such things as the coloured physical objects of the common sense world, where this is interpreted, not as an empirical proposition- like ‘There are non nonhuman featherless bipeds’- within the common sense frame, but as the expression of a rejection (in some sense) of this very framework itself, in favor of another built around different, if not unrelated, categories.¹⁰⁰

If for maximizing “explanatory coherence”, we have to *maximize* the integration of theoretical principles, the accuracy of prediction and the overall scope of the theory in question, we arrive at an understanding of this enterprise in the terms of a *multidimensional task*, which is a character shared a lot by Sellars’ analysis of the frameworks by which we encounter the world.

In effect, by reconstructing the two conceptual frameworks analyzed in *Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind*, Sellars makes use of a “principle of comprehension”, according to which “nothing in the phenomenal field is to be

completely repudiated, but rather relocated, and, hence, in an adequate explanation, accounted for”,¹⁰¹ in Sellars’ point of view, we have to accept the idea that we must be familiar with the trend of scientific enterprise, for, only in doing so, we can appreciate the framework categories of the manifest image of the world and the fact that scientific discourse is a *continuation* of a dimension of discourse already *embedded* in the common sense framework:

...then one would expect there to be a sense in which the scientific picture of the world replaces the common sense picture; a sense in which the scientific account of ‘what there is’ supersedes the descriptive ontology of everyday life.¹⁰²

ABBREVIATIONS

AKR Castañeda, H-N., (ed), *Action, Knowledge, and Reality*, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1975.

CDCM “Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities”, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, II, 1957, pp.225-308.

ENWW “Epistemology and the New Way of Words”, in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 44, 1947, pp.645-660.

EPM, “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind”, chap. 5 of SPR.

IAMB “The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem”, chap. 15 of PP.

ITSA, “Is There a Synthetic A Priori?”, in *Philosophy of Science*, 20, 1953, pp.121-138.

LRB “Language, Rules and Behavior”, in S. Hook (ed.), *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom*, The Dial Press, New York 1949, pp. 289-315.

ML “Meditations Leibniziennes”, in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, II, 1965, pp.105-118.

NAO *Naturalism and Ontology: the John Dewey Lectures for 1973-1974*, Ridgeview Publishing, Atascadero (CA), 1980.

PP *Philosophical Perspectives*, C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield 1967.

PPPW *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds: the Early Essays of Wilfrid Sellars*, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero (CA), 1980, pp.41-78.

PSIM “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, chap.1 of SPR.

RNWWR *Realism and the New Way of Words*, repr. in PPPW.

SK “The Structure of Knowledge” in H-N. Castañeda (ed.), *Action, Knowledge, and Reality*, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 1975.

SM *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes*, Routledge & Paul Kegan, London 1968.

SPR *Science, Perception and Reality*, Routledge & Paul Kegan, London 1963.

SRLG “Some Reflections on Language Games”, in *Philosophy of Science*, 21, 1954, pp.204-228; chap.11 of SPR.

CHAPTER 4

WITTGENSTEIN'S REMARKS ON COLOURS¹

Summary

My aim is to show how philosophical arguments regarding colours are treated very differently by Wittgenstein in the course of his philosophical research: from a logical point of view he would pass, in a second period, to attend to the same issues in a different way involving the relation between logic and experience, between perception and language, or between logical and grammatical forms which concern the way by which we encounter reality. Philosophy ought not to be concerned with logical or mathematical constructions, idealised and abstracted forms which lose every contact with our *Lebensformen*, but it must be related to the different ways by which we can describe the great range of phenomenon which constitute our world. There is no place for *explanation* at this point of analysis or there are not *supertheories* which impose *from above* upon the facts or events of the world. At this level of the philosophical investigation it is no more possible to reduce a philosophical approach to another one which is very different from the former: i.e. linguistic analysis to phenomenology and conversely.

As a conclusion, we could state that the language-game played by colour-words is something which presents itself, owing to the *multidimensional complexity* of its rules, with the character of “ineffability”, so that every attempt to reduce it to a more primitive game, or, worse still, to a conceptual scheme able to give an extrinsic explanation of its working goes wrong.

For whom who desires to achieve a systematical reconstruction of philosophical issues this conclusion may result unsatisfying like a proposition of the following form: “ it does work and that's all”; but for the one who is satisfied with a *descriptive* and *not a foundational* approach to philosophical questions the same conclusion may appear adequate.

1. The colour-exclusion problem

In the *Tractatus* we can find a place completely devoted to the colour exclusion problem: it is proposition 6.3751:

For two colours, *e.g.* to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logical impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour.

Therefore, the status of colour exclusion is acknowledged as a *logical* or *analytic* one; but, according to the definition of a *logical proposition* given in the *Tractatus* itself, this status cannot be allowed.

We can trace all the difficulties which arise at this point of our analysis back to the *Tractatus*.

In this work, a *well-formed formula* either *depicts* some facts, or is a *logical* one: the former class of propositions deals with facts, saying something about the world of which propositions are images (*Bilder*).

The truth-value of a *depicting* proposition may be obtained by comparing the proposition itself with the world: proposition 2.223 states as a matter of fact:

In order to discover whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

A condition for such a proposition of being meaningful is the possibility to be true or false, not just to have one truth-value; this depends on the ontological status of facts which are contingent, that is, of facts which can happen or not. For this reason *necessary* facts do not exist, so that the truth-value of meaningful depicting propositions is *a posteriori*.

Proposition 2.225 declares also:

There is no picture which is *a priori* true.

On the contrary, a well-formed formula has a truth-value *a priori*, excluding in this way the possibility to be identified with a depicting proposition; *logical propositions*, according to the *Tractatus*, have an *a priori* truth-value, as we can argue following proposition 4.46:

Among the possible groups of truth-conditions there are two extreme cases.

In the one case the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions.

We say that the truth-conditions are *tautological*.

In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities. The truth-conditions are *self-contradictory*.

In the first case we call the proposition a tautology, in the second case a contradiction.

Whatever truth-value combinations the constituents of a tautological or a self-contradictory proposition have, the resulting truth-value is invariable, that is to say, independent of the happening or not happening of any fact, thus *a priori*; consequently this kind of propositions does not depict any fact, they are not images.²

Hence, if a proposition is *a posteriori*, it is a depicting one, while being an *a priori* proposition means to be a *logical one*.

Therefore we can deduce that the classes of *a priori* propositions and of *logical* propositions coincide with one another, as well as the classes of *a posteriori* propositions and that of *depicting* ones.

Alleged this coincidence, it can be inferred that there are not *synthetic a priori* propositions, because it is impossible to say something about the world and at the same time to preserve the *a priori* status of the proposition involved.

According to Roberto Ciuni³, the appeal to Husserl's conception of analytic propositions (*analytische notwendige Sätze*) could be useful for a deeper comprehension of the problems involved by the colour exclusion problem. In the *Third Logical Investigation* Husserl points out:

We may define *analytically necessary propositions* as propositions whose truth is completely independent of the peculiar content of their objects (whether thought of with definite or indefinite universality) and of any possible existential assertions. They are propositions which permit of a *complete 'formalization'* and can be regarded as special cases or empirical applications of the formal, analytic laws whose validity appears in such formalizations. In an analytic proposition it must be possible, without altering the proposition's logical form, to replace all material which has content, with an empty formal *Something*, and to eliminate every assertion of existence by giving all one's judgements the form of universal, unconditional laws.⁴

Thus, the truth-value of analytically necessary propositions remains constant in every substitution instance of predicative and individual constants; in prop. 4.4661 of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein states that in a *logical proposition* the relation among signs (predicative or individual constants) does not matter:

Of course the signs are also combined with one another in the tautology and contradiction, *i.e.* they stand in relations to one another, but these relations are meaningless, unessential to the *symbol*.

Only combinations of the connectives are important in a logical proposition: this implies that a logical proposition keeps its truth-value in every substitution instance, so that it can be driven to the previous definition of an analytic proposition.

As we have seen, in the *Tractatus*, the notions of *necessity* and *impossibility* have a logical nature (that is, *tautology* and *contradiction*), and for this reason they have an analytic character; but this means that necessity and impossibility are *a priori*.

At this point of analysis, thence the problem concerning the colour exclusion arises: in fact a proposition like “ $R(p)t.B(p)t$ ” states the co-presence of two colours at the same place and at the same time: is this proposition to be grasped as a logical impossibility, as a contradiction?

Indeed, such a conjunction does not keep its truth-value in every substitution instance, since if one provides the previous proposition with a substitution like “This patch is red at time t and the same patch is small at time t ”, one has a proposition which can be true or false, not a *contradiction*.

Following Roberto Ciuni:

Since, clearly, $R(p)t.B(p)t$ does not have the form $\alpha \sim \alpha$ (I’ll discuss this option later), it cannot be said to be a *contradictory proposition*, and so the colour exclusion cannot be a *logical impossibility*⁵.

To avoid misunderstanding, it would be constructive to consider the role which the notion of *elementary proposition* plays in this problem: in the *Tractatus*, it is without doubt that an *Elementarsatz* is something stating relations of names in

“immediate combination”.⁶ An elementary proposition deals with objects that have the mark of *simplicity*: the *Tractatus* does not provide us with a criterion for resolving simple objects in complex objects.

Supporting Wittgenstein’s view on the contradictory, an analytic status of colour exclusion chooses an argument which recurs to the analysis of *transformational laws* which rule simple and complex objects.

These laws establish links between objects (a) and links between atomic propositions (b). As regards (a) a link between objects (and names) such as “Red(x):= \sim Blue(x)”;

as regards (b) a link between atomic propositions such as “a proposition contains ‘Red(x)’ \rightarrow the same proposition cannot contain ‘Blue (x)’”.

“Red(x):= \sim Blue(x)” is an example of what Wittgenstein calls in 6.3751 the “logical structure of colour”; but this example, as argued by Ciuni, does not solve the problem of colour exclusion.

If “R(p)t.B(p)t” had an analytic or a priori character, then it would lead to a proposition like “ \sim B(p)t.B(p)t”, that is a logical proposition. By this way, the *Tractatus* would be right in stating that “R(p)t.B(p)t” is a contradiction. However, if we argue in *extensional terms* (as it were, the way of reasoning adopted by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*), the truth conditions of being red are not the same as those of not being blue, since something could be not blue and be anyway not red (i.e., yellow). Therefore “Red(x) \leftrightarrow \sim Blue (x)” does not support the conjecture considered in (a).

As regards b), an important reason to refuse it, is that such an assumption, if accepted, would anticipate the idea of *internal relations* which Wittgenstein adopted as a new perspective afterwards and in some opposition to the theories contained in *Tractatus*.

Accepting b) would imply introducing a “*linked to content*” constraint, for the logical structure of objects would depend on properties and relations that hold for a certain domain of objects and not for another: in phenomenological terms, it would concern *material a priori* propositions.

This assumption then would be in contrast with the purely formal character of the contradiction whose falsehood does not depend on the kind of object considered.

Therefore, with regard to the colour exclusion problem, we are confronted with a conflict between something that is considered *a priori* (in virtue of his impossibility) and at the same time something (the same) which, according to the criteria of the *Tractatus*, cannot satisfy the requirements of being a contradiction: to some extent, a conflict between the *analytical* and the *synthetical* character of the proposition.

In fact it's impossible to consider $R(p)t.B(p)t$ as a contradiction, since it is not false for *every substitution instance* (Bolzano's principle).

The solution to this impasse could be to consider propositions like those concerning colours as examples of a *universal validity for a certain domain*, as far as these kind of propositions keep their truth-value in every substitution instance *only* with individual and predicative constants of the same kind.

2. Synthetic a priori laws

The above sketched solution is adopted by the phenomenological approach, particularly by Husserl in the *Third Logical Investigation*, where he introduces the notion of "syntethische Gesezten a priori".

According to Husserl, a synthetic a priori law is a "pure law, which includes material concepts, so as not to permit of a formalization of these concepts *salva veritate* „⁷

Content concepts (*Sachhaltige Begriffe*) are concepts whose character is not purely formal: while formal concepts deal with the empty ideas of *something* and *object*, so that the axioms that express their use are *ontological-formal*, on the contrary material concepts are gathered around different categories, *genera*, which concern different kinds of objects, different kinds of states of affair (*Sachhalten*).

Husserl explicates the notion of „logical form“ as:

Concepts like Something, One, Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, order, ordinal Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude etc., have a basically different character from concepts like House, Tree, Colour, Tone, Space, Sensation, Feeling etc., which for their part express genuine content. Whereas the former group themselves round the empty notion of Something or Object as such, and are associated with this through formal ontological axioms, the latter are disposed about various highest material Genera or categories, in which *material ontologies* have their root. This cardinal division between the 'formal' and the 'material' spheres of Essence gives

us the true distinction between the *analytically a priori* and the *synthetically a priori* disciplines (or laws and necessities).⁸

Husserl, as it were, *enlarges* and *enriches* the notion of “logical form” which in Wittgenstein is firmly tied up to Bolzano’s criterion based on the keeping of the truth-value in every substitution-instance; he, however, preserves this criterion even if the introduction of the notion of “formal” seems more articulated in comparison with its use in the past.

Wittgenstein, like Schlick⁹, would not admit the phenomenological notion of “formal”, considering his concept of logical truth tied up to tautology.

That is the reason why they (Wittgenstein and Schlick) use the examples which are not suitable to capture completely this notion¹⁰, in order to explain the Husserlian notion of “material a priori”.

The examples like “every note has a pitch” (Schlick) or “every rod has a length” (Wittgenstein) cannot be considered as *material a priori* propositions insofar, in doing so, we would misunderstand Husserl’s real intentions; in Husserl’s point of view, as it were, material a priori propositions are propositions like “there is not a colour without extension” or “there is not a pitch without a duration”.

Why does this misunderstanding arise?

Husserl distinguishes between *conjoined* and *disjoined* parts: conjoined parts have at least a part in common, while disjoined parts have nothing in common with regard to their content: if, for example, we consider the genus “colour” and the specie “red”, we can assume that they are *conjoined*, for the genus “colour” is a part (*intensional*) of the specie “red”; on the contrary, “extension” does not belong, as a part, to the genus “colour”: “extension”, as a matter of fact, makes “colour” part of a more inclusive whole which is called “coloured surface”; only this whole has as its parts both “colour” and “extension”; “extension” then, according to Husserl, is not a part of the genus “colour”.

Husserl supports the idea as follows:

In the unity of a sensory phenomenon we can perhaps discover a wholly determinate “moment” of redness as well as the generic “moment” of colour. Colour and determinate redness are not, however, disjoined “moments”. Redness on the other hand, and the extension that it covers, are such disjoined moments, since they have no community of content. They have, we may say, a

mutual association in the widest sense of the word; we have here a general relation of parts which is that of disjoined parts of a whole, an association of such parts. It now seems appropriate to call the associated parts *members* of the association: but to give so wide a sense to talk about members of a whole, means to count colour and shape as the associated parts of a coloured expanse¹¹.

On the ground of these considerations, note and pitch are not disjoined parts because it is thanks to a pitch that a note is different from a noise.

For Husserl, every relation of *dependence* or *independence* between contents is a relation which holds good only of disjoined parts.

Conjoined parts, as a matter of fact, are so strong mutually interwoven that it has no sense to think of their non-independence; *material a priori*, therefore, describes only non independent connections which cannot be understood as joined parts.

It is only because of the *disjunction* between parts that the empirical judgements as well as the material a priori ones can be called “synthetic”.

Examples like “every rod has a length” or “every note has a pitch” are not apt to be subsumed under *material a priori* propositions: in Husserl point of view, only propositions like “there isn’t a colour without extension” or “there isn’t a pitch without a duration” get the problem of the material a priori in the right perspective; the parts which constitute this kind of contents lie, as matter of course, at the same level.

Consider the argument adopted by Wittgenstein once more: we assume that a proposition like “an object cannot be red and green at the same time” is a synthetic judgment and that the word “cannot” means a *logical impossibility*; we know that every proposition is the negation of its negation and therefore it is correct to formulate the proposition “an object can be red and green at the same time”. If we maintain the first assumption, the last proposition turns out as a synthetic one; as synthetic it has sense and this means that the situation described by it *can* exist; but if we admit that “cannot” means a logical impossibility, we arrive at the conclusion that the impossible is possible.

The problem arises, according to Wittgenstein, when from the *fact* that a proposition has a sense we infer the *possibility* of its existence; for Husserl the negation of a synthetic a priori proposition (e.g. “there isn’t a colour without

extension”) has its sense even if the situation which this proposition describes cannot subsist.

3. Wittgenstein’s colour concept

The concept of colour recurs persistently in Wittgenstein’s philosophy; in the *Tractatus* he introduces not only the notion of “colour-space”, that appears in his later writings, but he also regards colour as one of the *forms* of objects.¹²

Wittgenstein’s remark that colour is the form of the object confirms the surmise that what he means by colour is not what we can know by means of physical or chemical examination, but what we know *immediately* from experience: just as we cannot perceive a stick without a length, thus

we cannot imagine an object without a visual field; the approach seems here to be a phenomenological one. Colour is one of the *built-in* logical forms in our immediate experience.

According to this point of view, it is the *structure* of colour, its logical form, that determines the impossibility of a point in visual space having two different colours at the same time: the analysis of colour thus becomes a conceptual one, not a physical, physiological, or psychological one.

A phenomenological colour theory is “a theory in pure phenomenology in which mention is only made of what is actually perceptible and in which non hypothetical objects occur”¹³.

Wittgenstein’s aim is to reveal the logical structure of colours, avoiding to add any hypothetical elements of physics; this conceptual analysis is based on colours in *colour-space*. Wittgenstein thinks that the usual and familiar way of representing colours is misleading, because it would be based on the *colour-circle* notion which lays down some difficulties as noted by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Remarks*:

At any rate, orange is a mixture of red and yellow in a sense in which yellow isn’t a mixture of red and green, although yellow comes between red and green in the colour circle¹⁴.

In the “colour-circle” frame in fact, orange lies between red and yellow, and yellow between red and green; but we do not produce yellow by mixing red and

green, as we produce orange from red and yellow: the two colours obey to different *grammatical laws*, so that the colour-circle is inappropriate to represent correctly the colours structure. For this reason, Wittgenstein proposes to use the *colour-octahedron* scheme for the right representation of colours we immediately experience.

The *colour-octahedron* is a good candidate for representing the colour-space, since it shows the correct grammar pertaining to the logical structure of colours; this representation cannot be established empirically by experiment, because it has an *a priori* status:

An octahedron with the pure colours at the corner-points e.g., provides a *rough* representation of colour-space, and this is a grammatical representation, not a psychological one. On the other hand, to say that in such and such circumstances you can see red after-image (say) is a matter of psychology. (This may, or may not, be the case- the other is *a priori*: we can establish the one by experiment but not the other.)¹⁵

With reference to the inappropriateness of the *colour-circle* to represent all the grammatical forms embodied by colours, Wittgenstein says that the two statements “Orange lies between red and yellow” and “Red lies between violet and orange” involve two different grammatical usages of the word “between”. Using the *colour-circle*, we are misled to think that there is a *uniform transition* from colour to colour, so that the two different usages of the word “between” become not understandable.

For example, in the case of primary colours, we do not have an image of a continuous transition, for we see only the discrete hues; moreover, we cannot produce the primary colours by mixing other intermediate colours.¹⁶

For Wittgenstein, it is fruitful to produce a better representation of colours, drawing a square which distinguishes four “corner-points” where we can locate the primary colours: *blue*, *green*, *yellow* and *red*; if we add to the previous square black and white, we are naturally driven to use an *octahedron* whose bottom and top corner-points would represent black and white respectively. The latter colours, as a matter of fact, are radically different, as regards their grammatical form, from the other ones.

Wittgenstein's concern is here, as stated above, a grammatical one: grammar, in this context, replaces his early-period concept of logic; but grammar in the case of colours seems susceptible to phenomenological considerations, as is suggested by the following remarks:

The words 'Colour', 'Sound', 'Number' etc. could appear in the chapter headings of our grammar. They need not occur within the chapter but that is where their structure is given.¹⁷

Is not, to make an example, the theory of harmony, at least, in part *phenomenology* and in part *grammar*?

The theory of harmony isn't a matter of taste.¹⁸

The way in which musical notes are combined to produce a chord is not a matter of taste, but is somehow already built into each note.

Grammar and phenomenology have in cases like this the same function for the fact that they allow some combinations of words, while excluding other combinations as nonsense: it is a nonsense to say that one colour smells or that a colour is a tone higher than another.

Another grammatical example is provided by Wittgenstein's denial to apply the words "closer to" and "further from" to colour concepts.¹⁹ It is important to underline once more that by talking about colour, Wittgenstein uses a logical analysis of colour concepts based on colour-space:

The specific effort made for this by him is to find the better, if not the right, representation of colour-space. In fact, Wittgenstein sees that the colour-octahedron, in contrast to the colour-circle, is a grammatical representation of colour-space.²⁰

For the Wittgenstein of the early period, colours are objects with logical forms: logical forms are given together with objects; in other words, objects have a *built-in* feature of logical forms. All we need is thus to experience objects. Wittgenstein's rejection of separate logical forms allows the reduction of all the logical forms to the logical forms of simple objects: all the complex logical forms have to be built out of the logical forms of simple objects. Between logical forms

and facts there is an *isomorphic relation*: the basic idea of Wittgenstein's *picture theory* is that an elementary proposition is a picture of reality by being an isomorphic copy of the corresponding state of affairs.

However, what about complex propositions? Wittgenstein has to explain how we understand complex propositions as pictures of reality, extending his picture theory, applied initially to elementary propositions, to all propositions. The solution adopted by Wittgenstein is the *truth-function theory* as expressed explicitly in proposition 5 of the *Tractatus*:

A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.

Returning to the colour issue of the early Wittgenstein, the logical forms of colours determine the way in which colours are combined in our experience; the vocabulary of colour terms is based on the acquaintance with colours in visual space. Colours are for the early Wittgenstein phenomenological objects because they have *built-in* logical forms within themselves: colour-incompatibility, as pointed above, is a phenomenological question; for the same reason there is a great difference between *physical impossibility* and *logical impossibility*.

In the *Blue Book* Wittgenstein asserts:

Let us think straight away of a similar case: "The colours green and blue can't be in the same place simultaneously." Here the picture of physical impossibility which suggests itself is, perhaps, not that of a barrier : rather we feel that the two colours are in each other's way. What is the origin of this idea?- We say three people can't sit side by side on this bench; they have no room. Now the case of the colours is no analogous to this: but it is somewhat analogous to saying: "3x 18 inches won't go into 3 feet." This is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility.²¹

Once again Wittgenstein here is concerned with phenomenology and not with physics: as it were, with what we *immediately* know without any empirical testing. Finding by means of grammatical investigations of language, the logic that lies behind immediate experience, we put forward the assimilation of grammar to phenomenology.

Even if Wittgenstein rejects phenomenological language, he still believes that a phenomenological analysis remains possible, for language still mirrors reality, even if in a different way compared to the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein explains the rules of the use of language as follows:

The investigation of the rules of the use of our language, the recognition of these rules, and their clearly surveyable representation amounts to, i.e. accomplishes the same thing as, what one often wants to achieve in constructing a phenomenological language.

Each time we recognize that such and such a mode of presentation can be replaced by another one, we take a step toward that goal.²²

4. The use of the term “phenomenology” in Wittgenstein’s works

According to Jaakko Hintikka, the use of the term “phenomenology” in Husserl and in Wittgenstein has a common source: the term at stake had an established usage in the early decades of the 20th century in the philosophy of physics according to which science ought to deal only with observable objects, rejecting pure concepts.²³

Husserl acknowledges himself that his phenomenology can be considered as a *radicalisation* of Mach’s phenomenology²⁴: the affinity, as regards the idea of phenomenology, between Husserl and Mach is never been emphasized.

Hintikka contends that it can be demonstrated that Wittgenstein is familiar with this sense of the term “phenomenology”: for instance, the Austrian philosopher possessed several volumes of Boltzmann’s writings who used the very word “Phänomenologie”.

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy however was, in some sense, a result of the revision of Russell’s theory of acquaintance achieved by omitting logical forms from the range of objects of acquaintance; in addition to this, it would be a misunderstanding to assimilate the simple objects contained in the *Tractatus* with physical atoms: simple objects, as a matter of facts, are basic entities directly given to us.

Like Boltzmann and Hertz, the Austrian philosopher was concerned primarily with the *representation* of the given reality in thought and in language; Boltzmann, for example, referred to those representations as “pictures” (*Bilder*).

Wittgenstein kept up with the ideas of Boltzmann and Hertz, while considering the possibility of solving conceptual problems by devising a *suitable notation*: this is the case of the above mentioned problem of colour incompatibility.

Proposition 6.3751 of the *Tractatus* asserts:

For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.

Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be at two places at the same time; as a matter of fact, particles that are in different places cannot be identical.

It has been recognized that here Wittgenstein's reference to physics serves to *explain* rather than to *solve* colour incompatibility: he aims, as it were, at the development of a notation capable of turning colour incompatibility into a *tautology*. According to Hertz, the first task of a physicist is to develop a system of concepts ("images") regulated by laws which govern the phenomena they represent.

It is also worth stating the fact that, according to the Austrian philosopher, reality is phenomenological; this implies that reality determines how it ought to be represented: a correct notation, if possible, could represent perfectly reality, rendering the question about the adopted methods idle.

According to Jaakko Hintikka, Wittgenstein's philosophical development in 1929 was the replacement of the phenomenological language given in *Tractatus* by an everyday physicalistic language as the only possible language in philosophy.

In the first section of *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein states:

I do not now have phenomenological language, or "primary language" as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary²⁵.

Wittgenstein goes further, affirming that a phenomenological language is not possible; there is a formulation in Waismann's *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, which is striking as to clear up the point above:

I used to believe that there was the everyday language that we all usually spoke and a primary language that expressed what we really knew, namely phenomena. I also spoke of a first system and a second system. Now I wish to explain why I do not adhere to that conception any more. I think that essentially we have only one language, everyday language.²⁶

From the quoted passages above, we could argue that Wittgenstein, starting from 1929, was concerned with a change of the language paradigm.

Calling for further explanations, we have to ask whether or not there is any difference between an *everyday language* and a *physicalistic language*. The answer is very clear:

The propositions of our grammar are always of the same sort as propositions of physics and not of the same sort as the “primary” propositions which treat of what is immediate.²⁷

The change of the language paradigm however does not mean for Wittgenstein to give up the initial goals of his philosophical enterprise.

It is worth noting that albeit a comparison with the *Tractatus* shows little difference as regard the switching of the language paradigm towards a phenomenological basic language, Wittgenstein, however does not speak anywhere in the *Tractatus* or in the *Notebooks* 1914-1916 of a “primary language” or a “primary system”: a term like “primary system” is used by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Remarks*.²⁸ It may be supposed, according to Hintikka, that Wittgenstein uses these terms while discussing with members of the Vienna Circle.

However, in the *Big Typescript* it is shown that even if Wittgenstein is no longer engaged in a construction of a phenomenological language, he nevertheless is interested in the same phenomenological problems as before.

Of particular interest is his assertion that “phenomenology is grammar”; this identification of phenomenology and grammar will play a great role also in *Remarks on Colour*.²⁹

Wittgenstein’s rejection of all natural hypotheses and theories affords him the access that he needs for the phenomenological descriptions of time, space and colour.

A phenomenology of time is radically different from the physics of time; analogously, a phenomenology of space gives us the evidence of the fact that objective, physical space is a *construction* based on subjective, visual space. Therefore, a phenomenological investigation of space would isolate space from its owner, from the sense organs, and from all the physical theories of space. For this reason phenomenological geometry will not be Euclidean (nor Riemannian, etc.): phenomenology is not interested in the validity of this or that theory, but in the general structure of experience *as a whole*.

In *The Big Typescript* Wittgenstein asserts:

The geometry of our visual space is given to us, i.e. finding it doesn't require an investigation hitherto hidden facts. In the sense of a physical psychological investigation, our isn't one at all. Nevertheless, one can say that we don't yet know this geometry. This geometry is grammar, and our investigation is a grammatical investigation.³⁰

Taking a step forward, we find in the same chapter of the *Big Typescript*:

One could talk almost about an external and internal geometry. What is arranged in visual space is situated in this *kind* of order *a priori*, i.e. by virtue of its logical nature, and in this case geometry is simply grammar. What the physicist puts in relation to each other within the geometry of physical space are readings from instruments that, by virtue of their *internal* nature, are no different whether we are living in a flat or a spherical physical space. That is to say, it isn't an investigation into the logical properties of these readings that leads the physicist to an assumption about the nature of physical space, but the facts that he has read off.³¹

Making phenomenological research, we are not concerned with *facts*, but only with *possibilities*:

here, according to Nicholas Gier³², the closeness of Wittgenstein to the last Husserl.

Wittgenstein's realization that colour incompatibility cannot be reduced to formal, logical contradiction has prompted some interpreters to see the work *Remarks on colours* as something very close to a disintegration of the *Tractatus*. Peter Hacker explains this idea as:

...Wittgenstein's first philosophy collapsed over its inability to solve one problem- colour exclusion. Once the intractability of this problem became clear, the main struts of the whole system collapsed.³³

Another interpreter like Anthony Kenny, however, admits that the apparent mixing of the logical and the empirical entailed by the recognition of a *logic of colour* may be seen indeed only as the development of Wittgenstein's holding that the truth-functional logic of the *Tractatus* is fundamentally an applied one: logic in *Tractatus* is not cut off from the world, since it has to recognize the existence of something or the being of facts.

By acknowledging the existence of a colour-space, Wittgenstein strengthened the essential connection between *logical syntax* and its *application* in the description of empirical states of affairs.

Holding this point of view, Wittgenstein's later conception of logical syntax can be seen as a widening rather than an abandonment of his earlier view:

Against Wittgenstein's new view [of logical syntax] Schlick protested that the truth functional constants seemed to be more essential to language than the particular rules of syntax. The possibility of constructing conjunctive propositions, he said, seemed to be a much more general, all-embracing fact than the rule of syntax that red and blue could not be in the same place. But Wittgenstein replied that he thought there was non crucial distinction here. The rules for the truth-functions were not to be separated from other rules of syntax. "Both" he said "belong to the method of depicting the world".³⁴

However, according to Marie Macginn, Wittgenstein's commitment to the independence of elementary propositions in *Tractatus* counts as a commitment to the purity of logic; therefore it is difficult to make completely compatible this position with the later positions which insist more on the applicability of logic: recognizing that colour exclusion cannot be reduced to a formal contradiction, Wittgenstein takes a closer step towards the persuasion that a pure formal logic is a *myth*.

Indeed, the central distinction between system of representation and its application, put in other words, between form and content, remains intact in the

later works of Wittgenstein, even if the concept of form is transformed into *social or cultural constraints*.

Therefore, we can admit that there is a certain continuity in Wittgenstein's development, at least as regards to the problems which are at stake when we confront language with the world.

While tackling the problem of colour exclusion in *Some Remarks on Logical Form*, Wittgenstein is still persuaded that logic does not deal with the internal construction of elementary propositions:

We can only arrive at a correct analysis [of elementary propositions] by, what might be called, the logical investigation of phenomena, i.e. in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori possibilities.³⁵

In other words, Wittgenstein no longer believes that analysis would arrive at elementary propositions that are logically independent; on the contrary, we can assert *a priori* that there are *internal* or *hierarchical* relations that exist between elementary propositions belonging to particular logical fields: i.e. propositions which deal with space, colours, sounds etc.

Moreover, he believes that such a hierarchical relationship is to be envisaged in terms of the hierarchy of the number system:

For their representation numbers (rational and irrational) must enter into then structure of the atomic propositions themselves.³⁶

Colour propositions, in this view, are founded on a *pure, a priori hierarchy* analogous to that which determines the scale for measuring length; for this reason, elementary propositions of colour are related reciprocally in an analogous way to that which holds for propositions about lengths: propositions like "A is 1.5 metres tall" and "B is 1.9 metres tall".

According to this point of view, the colour exclusion problem can be cleared as follows:

It is a characteristic of these properties that one degree of them excludes any other. One shade of colour cannot simultaneously have two different degrees of brightness or redness, a tone not two

different strengths, etc. And the important point here is that these remarks do not express an experience but are in some sense tautologies.³⁷

At this point of analysis, Wittgenstein manifests the clear conviction that, admitted the completeness of the analysis of colour propositions, such nonsensical constructions like “A is red and A is green” may be avoided by virtue of the symbolism which expresses the propositions themselves.

Wittgenstein explicates:

These [rules of syntax] will have to tell us that in the case of certain kinds of atomic propositions described in terms of definite symbolic features certain combinations of the T's and F's [in the truth-table] must be left out.³⁸

This early response to the problem of colour exclusion keeps the myth of a pure a priori still alive, that is to say, the myth of a pure formal syntax able to make clear the internal connections between propositions.

However, the idea of a colour-scale represents a development as regards the *Tractatus* conception of the logic of our language.

As Marie McGinn explains:

The system of logical syntax that is embedded in our language is now seen to be ineluctably tied up with the existence of descriptive conventions (specifically properties of degree) whose application is a matter, not merely of there being a world, but of our employing particular modes of describing it. Logic has, in a sense, become more closely tied up with the world than it is in the excessively pure conception of the *Tractatus*.³⁹

In this view, *Some Remarks on Logical Form* can be acknowledged as the first step on the road from logic to grammar.

By the end of 1929, the notion of elementary proposition deals no more with the idea of a complete analysis, but simply with *surface properties* of propositions; with regard to the system of colours, Wittgenstein believes that it has no longer the same *multiplicity* as lengths: we cannot, for example, say how many degrees

closer to red one orange is than another. The number system therefore is no more the real ground of the internal relations that exist between colours.

Wittgenstein's rejection of the completeness and importance of analysis goes along with his abandoning the idea of an *essence of depiction*.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, he remarks:

The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need)⁴⁰.

In this new approach to the logic of language, Wittgenstein has come to see that its essence cannot be something *universal* or *pure* lying behind all systems of representation: the way by which the language does work is "in plain view" and manifest in the everyday use of language. What it matters is aiming at a clear view of the grammar that the everyday use of language makes evident.

In the *Tractatus*, on the contrary, Wittgenstein synthesizes his conception of logic with the following words:

Thought is surrounded by a halo.- Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it- It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is.⁴¹

5. *Remarks on colours*

After having introduced some issues concerning colours, we can begin investigating all the philosophical problems connected with the work *Remarks on colours* written by Wittgenstein in the years 1950-1951.

In this text, more than in others, philosophy turns out to be an *accurate* and *local* analysis of the different uses of languages; he doubts whether a too generalised investigation of philosophical problems might allow to clarify the puzzles that emerges when we encounter the great variety of phenomenon which makes up the

reality; instead of it, it may be more reliable a method which doesn't resolve *the friction* of the reality in theories which, in virtue of their pureness, lose every contact with the world.

It is an operation of *intellectual desublimation* which invests every field of culture: we must, according to Wittgenstein, avoid to transfigure the phenomenon belonging to our *Lebenswelt* idealizing and objectifying them in some abstracts and a priori; on the contrary, we have only to check the real and effective conditions of that phenomenon, of that *Lebensformen*, as Wittgenstein would have said.

We have to think less and to attend more at the real world; philosophy does not aim anymore to bring hypothetical arguments, but to trace out descriptions of the investigated phenomenon.

Wittgenstein clarifies his ideas about philosophy in the *Philosophical Investigations* as follows:

Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.

For it cannot give it any foundation either.

It leaves everything as it is.

It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can advance it. A "leading problem of mathematical logic" is for us a problem of mathematics like any other.⁴²

He adds also:

It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs *before* the contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.)

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then we follow the rules, things do not turn put as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).

It throws light on our concept of *meaning* something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't mean it like that."

The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.⁴³

Wittgenstein concludes:

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.- Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

One might also give the name “philosophy” to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions⁴⁴.

Philosophy then might not work out a logical-mathematical contradiction, but clarify the “civil state” of the contradiction or its condition in the civil world: every form of knowledge, even the more sophisticated, as a matter of course, is always rooted in our worldly praxis, in our, Husserl would have said, *prepredicative commercium* with our environment.

Wittgenstein points out in *The Blue Book*:

Now what makes it difficult for us to take this line of investigation is our craving for generality. This craving for generality is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular philosophical confusions. There is-

(a) The tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term.- We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term “game” to the various games; whereas games form a *family* the members of which have family likeness.[...]

(b) There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression, to think that the man who has learnt to understand a general term, say, the term “leaf”, has thereby come to possess a kind of general picture of leaf, as opposed to pictures of particular leaves.[...]

(c) Again, the idea we have of what happens when we get hold of the general idea “leaf”, “plant”, etc. etc., is connected with the confusion between a mental state, meaning a state of a hypothetical mental mechanism, and a mental state meaning a state of consciousness (toothache, etc.).

(d) Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws.[...] Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive”.[...]

Instead of “craving for generality” I could also have said “the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case”.[...]

The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigations; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term. When Socrates asks the question, “what is knowledge?” he does not even regard it as a *preliminary* answer to enumerate cases of knowledge.⁴⁵

The problem that at this point of our analysis arises is whether the issues concerning colours constitute a relevant context of philosophical questions: colours questions are relevant, in my point of view, because they clear up very important problems of the philosophical and epistemological reflection, such as the kind of relation between logic and experience, or language and perception, or the possible relation between grammatical and empirical propositions.

For example, Wittgenstein starts his enquiry on colours, bringing to the light the linguistic misunderstandings tied to propositions which have apparently the same logical form, even if their *deep grammar* makes these propositions very different one from the other.

To report e.g. whether a body is lighter or darker than another is very different from stating the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of colour, even if the form of the propositions here concerned is the same: “X is lighter than Y”.

Wittgenstein stresses a language-game as:

A language-game: report whether a certain body is lighter or darker than another.- But now there’s a related one: State the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of colour. (Compare with this: Determining the relationship between the lengths of two sticks- and the relationship between two numbers.)- The form of the propositions on both language-games is the same: “X is lighter than Y”. But in then first it is an external relations and the proposition is temporal, in the second it is an internal relation and the proposition is timeless.⁴⁶

Here we are concerned with linguistic misunderstandings, in other cases Wittgenstein attends to the riddles which pertain to the relation between perception and language (or thinking).

An example which gets clear of the relation between perception and language is the following one:

I see in a photograph (not a colour photograph) a man with dark hair and a boy with slicked-back blond hair standing in front of lathe, which is made in part of castings painted black, and in part of smooth axles, gears, etc., and next to it a grating made of light galvanized wire. I see the finished iron surfaces as iron-coloured, the boy's hair as blond, the grating as zinc-coloured, despite the fact that everything is depicted in lighter and darker tones of the photographic paper.⁴⁷

About the analogy between colours and language-games or their inscription in forms of life, Wittgenstein writes:

Ask this question: Do you know what "reddish" means? And how do you show that you know it? Language-games: "Point to a reddish yellow (white, blue, brown)- "Point to an even more reddish one"- "A less reddish one" etc. Now that you've mastered this game you will be told "Point to a somewhat reddish green" Assume there are two cases: Either you do point to a colour (and always the same one), perhaps to an olive green- or you say, "I don't know what that means," or "There's no such thing."

We might be inclined to say that the one person had a different colour concept from the other; or a different concept of '...ish'.⁴⁸

From the passage above we may argue that different men can have different concepts of colour, and when this happens then, according to Wittgenstein, these men live in different practical, theoretical contexts or *Lebensformen*. It could seem thus that it is impossible to find any *bridge-concepts* capable of assuring the translation or reduction of a concept belonging to a particular form of life to another one which is proper to a different *Lebensform*.

We would have in this hypothetical case people having a "different geometry of colour"; we find ourselves so in situations in which the common understanding is very difficult to yield:

There may be mental defectives who cannot be taught the concept 'tomorrow', or the concept 'I', no to tell time. Such people would not learn the use of the word 'tomorrow' etc..

Now to whom can I describe *what* these people cannot learn? Just to one who has learnt it? Can't I tell A that B cannot learn higher mathematics, even though A hasn't mastered it? Doesn't the person who has learned the game understand the word "chess" differently from someone who hasn't learnt it? There are differences between the use of the word which the former can make, and the use which the latter has learnt.⁴⁹

The problem arisen at this point of the analysis grows further if we do not fix the kind of relation subsisting between colour-games and reality. In fact, if we admit that colours words point to the private sphere of the subject (like sensations), then the only way to verify if two subjects intend colour-words in the same way, is to attend to the subjects' *use* of the same word in equal circumstances. No other warranty is allowed. But if the link between language-games and reality is totally interrupted, then we have no means of comparing words each other; this is a very crucial point to which Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka recur in their work *Investigating Wittgenstein*: have colours-concepts a *zero semantic*? According to them, no! Because of the fact that language-games like that of colours are basilar or *primitive* games on which all the other are grounded, if we don't permit any kind of link between word-colours and reality, then we expose the other higher games to the danger of being *inconsistent* or of being *nonsensical*.

According to Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka in fact, Wittgenstein seems to assert that all that matters in colour issues concerns *modes of behaviour*: all this implies that colour-language ought to be *public* and completely different from *colour-impressions*.

For instance, in *Remarks on Colour*, Wittgenstein, discussing the difference between a colour-blind and a normal person, writes:

The one can learn a language-game that the other one cannot. And indeed *this must* be what constitutes colour-blindness of all kinds. For if the "colour-blind" person could learn all the language-games of normal people, why should he be excluded from certain professions?⁵⁰

From the passage above, we are inclined to assume that colour-blindness is not a question of colour experiences or impressions very different from those of normal persons, but merely a matter of difference in the language-games that one can learn while the other can't.⁵¹

But these are not Wittgenstein's last words concerning colour-language; indeed, he asserts explicitly that sets of concepts, like sensations and colours, *operate* in analogous ways:

I treat colour concepts like the concepts of sensations.⁵²

The colour concepts are to be treated like the concepts of sensations.⁵³

The analogy looks wrong-headed and even *paradoxical*⁵⁴: primary language-games which establish the semantical links between private sensations and the language by which we express them rely on spontaneous expressions of different sensations.

However, this is not the case of the colour-language: according to Wittgenstein we must, as a matter of fact, avoid every use of a psychological interpretation of colour issues; colours have any kind of effect (sensuous, moral,) on the subject who sees them.

Colour-language is e.g. radically different from *physiognomic* games: in which e.g. the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it; it does mean that in physiognomic games the modes of behaviour, which render the game public, can be replaced by speech-acts. In the case of colour-words however, saying that their meanings consist in expressive or linguistic behaviour seems absurd:

Wittgenstein's favourite, albeit admittedly oversimplified, example of such a language-game is a game of colour comparisons played by means of colour samples or colour charts. The public framework (samples or charts relied on in such games) is of course nonlinguistic and nonbehavioural. Hence it may seem again that the analogy Wittgenstein sees between sensation-language and colour-language is spurious.⁵⁵

With the parallelism between colour-words and sensation-words, Wittgenstein is interested in the searching for a public framework in which they both can be expressed; in this sense, we can understand why does Wittgenstein need a language-game in which colour-words play a role. Language-games, in fact, are always public in principle; according to this point of view, we can also understand why the *simplest* public framework for colour-words is represented by the physical colour samples. The analogy however between this kind of language-game and the physiognomic one demonstrates that the primitive game constituted by colour words cannot work if we want to avoid ridiculous consequences. For this reason, we have to search for another and better account of the grammar of

colour-words; another candidate, relied on remembered colour-images, is sharply rejected by Wittgenstein:

But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we *bear in mind* the colour (for instance) that a word stands for? – “And if we bear it in mind then it comes before our mind’s eye when we utter the word. So, if it is always supposed to be possible for us to remember, it must be in itself indestructible.”- But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?- When we work with a sample instead of our memory there are circumstances in which we say that the sample has changed colour and we judge of this by memory. But can we not sometimes speak of a darkening (for example) of our memory-image? Aren’t we as much at the mercy of memory as of a sample? (For someone might feel like saying : “If we had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample”.)- Or perhaps of some chemical reaction. Imagine that you were supposed to paint a particular colour “C”, which was the colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined.- Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than another; would you not sometimes say: “ I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday”? This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tell us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.⁵⁶

How, then, may we describe the primary language-game played by colour-words? If we use the colour-sample game to describe the rules of the primary language-game instantiated by colour-words, we are wrong.

According to Wittgenstein as a matter of fact, there is not a lot to say about these rules: the language-game with colour-words does work only if the *colour-identification* is made correctly.

Rule-following is *constitutive* of the language-game in question, and nothing more can be said: a *language-game is played* and nothing more; primary rules are followed “blindly”, “automatically” and “as a matter of course”.

This is the reason why everyone is tempted initially to understand Wittgenstein’s description of the language-game with colour-words as a *rejection* of inner experiences⁵⁷.

By emphasizing the analogy between “sensation concepts” and “colour concepts”, we are forced to admit that in both language-games basic attributions are made without any further justification: people’s verbal reactions to their colour experiences can be as spontaneous, primitive and automatic as their reactions to sensations.

Just as it is impossible, i.e. in a physiognomic language-game to make a distinction between having an impression and giving it its natural expression, for the same reason it would be impossible to drive a wedge between physical colours and colour-impressions.

Wittgenstein emphasizes this point by giving a striking analogy:

Someone paints a picture in order to shew how he imagines a theatre scene. And now I say: "This picture has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words inform- but for the one who gives the information it is a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image, as it can't be for anyone else. To him his private impression of the picture means what he has imagined, in a sense in which the picture cannot mean this to others."- And what right have I to speak in this second case of a representation or piece of information- if these words were rightly used in the *first* case?⁵⁸

Taking this interpretative path, we do not find essential difference between sensation concepts and colour concepts even if we admit that colours have a *clearer structure* than sensations.

However, Wittgenstein never tells us what the language-games with colours are really like: this would depend, according to Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill Hintikka, on the "enormous complexity and subtlety" of this kind of language-game.

Remarks on Colours is then an attempt to deal with this irreducible *complexity*: we are confronted therefore with many *dimensions* by which the space of colours can be articulated: *proximity* (relating to the shade of a colour) vs. *distance*, *pure* vs. *impure* colours, *opacity* vs. *transparency*. In order to have a deeper investigation on colour-issues, we have then to connect colour-concepts with other concepts from the world of vision:

Because of this many-dimensional character of colour concepts, Wittgenstein follows his wonted strategy of merely assembling reminders of the relevant conceptual points concerning colours. We, too, have to be satisfied with the same.⁵⁹

When we use colour-concepts or colour-words we have to do with *vague* concepts for which it's very difficult to achieve some sharpness or to draw boundaries; the task to draw sharp boundaries is due to logic, but not the everyday language.

Wittgenstein explains logic in *The Big Typescript* as:

It is as if for certain games one draws a line right through the middle of the playing field in order to separate the teams, but doesn't otherwise mark off the field, since this isn't necessary.

When Frege says that logic doesn't know what to do with vague concepts, this is true in so far it is precisely the sharpness of concepts that belongs to the method of logic. That is what the expression "Logic is normative" can refer to.

[...]It is essential to logic to draw boundaries, but not such boundaries are drawn in the language we speak. But this doesn't mean that logic represents language incorrectly, or that it represents an ideal language. Its task is to portray a colourful, blurred reality as a pen-and-ink drawing.⁶⁰

If we try to analyze colour-words, we cannot recur to "pen-and-ink" conceptual schemes even if some, as it were, "regularities", some unassailable truths (e.g. the *octahedron frame*) must be presupposed to match colour issues. In our attempt to describe uses of colour-words, we must admit 1) that some sentences are often used *on the borderline* between logic and the empirical; 2) that in philosophy it is not enough in every case to say something about an object, but also to learn *how* to speak about it.

And don't I have to admit that sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the empirical, so that their meaning shifts back and forth and they are now expressions of norms, now treated as expressions of experience?

For it is not the 'thought' (an accompanying mental phenomenon) but its use (something that surrounds it), that distinguishes the logical proposition from the empirical one.⁶¹

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NOTES

Notes to chapter 1

- ¹ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", in Th. M. Seebohm, D. Follesdal, J. N. Mohanty (eds.), *Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences*, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer 1991, pp.59-77.
- ² See E. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, in part. §7; hereafter *EJ*.
- ³ *EJ*, 91.
- ⁴ *EJ*, 272.
- ⁵ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.64.
- ⁶ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.75.
- ⁷ See J. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl's Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973; in part. see the chapter "Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language" in the same volume.
- ⁸ L. Landgrebe, 'Unmittelbarkeit der Erfahrung', in L. Landgrebe (ed.), *Edmund Husserl. 1859-1959*, Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye 1959, p.253.
- ⁹ L. Landgrebe, cit., p.257.
- ¹⁰ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.76.
- ¹¹ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.76.
- ¹² P. Simons, 'Meaning and Language', in B. Smith and D. W. Smith (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.132 .
- ¹³ *EJ*, 204.
- ¹⁴ *EJ*, 204.
- ¹⁵ *EJ*, 122.
- ¹⁶ *EJ*, 122.
- ¹⁷ A. Schuetz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. XX, 2, 1959, p.148.
- ¹⁸ See A. Schuetz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy", cit., p.150.
- ¹⁹ E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1969, p.320; hereafter *FLT*.
- ²⁰ *FLT*, 320.
- ²¹ See § 5 of E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, second book, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1989; hereafter *IPPII*.
- ²² J. N. Mohanty, "Intentionality and Possible World: Husserl and Hintikka", in H. Dreyfus (ed.), *Husserl: Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, MIT Press, Cambridge 1982, p.236.
- ²³ J. Hintikka, "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes", in Davis, Hockney, Wilson (eds.), *Philosophical Logic*, Reidel Dordrecht 1969, p.24.
- ²⁴ R. Cobb-Stevens, *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1990, pp.1-2.
- ²⁵ Th. M. Seebohm, "Possible 'Worlds': Remarks about a Controversy", in F.M. Kirkland, D.P. Chattopadhyaya (eds.), *Phenomenology: East and West. Essays in Honor of J. N. Mohanty*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1993, p.141.
- ²⁶ D. Lohmar, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis*, Dordrecht, Kluwer 1998.
- ²⁷ D. Lohmar, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis*, cit., p.252.
- ²⁸ *EJ*, 202.
- ²⁹ E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2001, p.95; hereafter *ACP*.
- ³⁰ *ACP*, 96.
- ³¹ Cfr. *EJ*, 199.

- ³² D. Lohmar, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis*, cit. p. 253.
- ³³ *EJ*, 203.
- ³⁴ *EJ*, 203.
- ³⁵ Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, "Modalization and Modalities", cit., p.66.
- ³⁶ *EJ*, 239.
- ³⁷ J. N. Mohanty, "Intentionality and Possible World: Husserl and Hintikka", cit., 251.
- ³⁸ J. N. Mohanty, "Husserl on 'possibility'", *Husserl Studies*, 1, 1984.
- ³⁹ *IPPII*, 275.
- ⁴⁰ Cfr. J. N., Mohanty, "Husserl on 'possibility'", cit., p.26.
- ⁴¹ *IPPI*, 205.
- ⁴² See M. Heidegger, *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, in Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 38, Frankfurt a. Main 1998, p.79.
- ⁴³ Cfr. E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934-1937*, Kluwer, The Hague 1992, pp.425-426.
- ⁴⁴ E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, pp.142-143.
- ⁴⁵ Ms. K III 6/54a.

Notes to chapter 2

- ¹ E. Husserl, *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997, p.2; hereafter *TS*.
- ² See *IP*, 33.
- ³ *TS*, 2.
- ⁴ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. I, Routledge & Paul Kegan, London 1970, pp. 157-158.
- ⁵ E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, p. 123.
- ⁶ E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, vol. I, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1982, p.361; hereafter *IPPI*.
- ⁷ U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1964, p. 50.
- ⁸ *IPPI*, 361.
- ⁹ *IPPI*, 363.
- ¹⁰ E. Husserl, *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, vol. II, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1989, p.41; hereafter *IPPII*.
- ¹¹ *IPPII*, 45.
- ¹² *IPPII*, 46.
- ¹³ *IPPII*, 47.
- ¹⁴ *TS*, 257.
- ¹⁵ *TS*, 132.
- ¹⁶ *TS*, 136.
- ¹⁷ *TS*, 137.
- ¹⁸ *TS*, 141.
- ¹⁹ *TS*, 143.
- ²⁰ *TS*, 149.
- ²¹ *TS*, 157.
- ²² *TS*, 158.
- ²³ *TS*, 169.
- ²⁴ *TS*, 208.
- ²⁵ *TS*, 208.
- ²⁶ *TS*, 210.
- ²⁷ *TS*, 213.
- ²⁸ *TS*, 230.
- ²⁹ *TS*, 238.
- ³⁰ *TS*, 241.
- ³¹ *TS*, 242.

- ³² See E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, University of California Press, 1998, p.218.
- ³³ See E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p.218.
- ³⁴ E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p. 219.
- ³⁵ See, U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, cit., p.127.
- ³⁶ See L. Landgrebe, "Prinzipien einer Lehre vom Empfinden", in *Zeitschrift fuer philosophische Forschung*, VIII, 1954, p.205.
- ³⁷ U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, cit., p.129.
- ³⁸ U. Claesges, *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*, cit., p.122.
- ³⁹ E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p.219.
- ⁴⁰ See Beilage 73, "Die Konstitution des Raumes in Synthetischen Uebergang von Nahraum zu Nahraum", in E. Husserl, *Zur Phaenomenologie des Intersubjectivitaet*. Zweiter Teil: 1921-28, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973, where Husserl writes, among other things, that "der Raum [ist] konstituiert im Uebergang von Nahraum zu Nahraum durch Fernkinaesthesen" (p.546).
- ⁴¹ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1953, p. 135.
- ⁴² See M. Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, Harper & Row, New York 1971, p. 93.
- ⁴³ E.S. Casey, *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, cit., p.220.
- ⁴⁴ E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, cit., p.217.

Notes to chapter 3

- ⁴⁵ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1979.
- ⁴⁶ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.170.
- ⁴⁷ W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Ithaca 2005, p.62.
- ⁴⁸ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.64. Sellars points out that the question concerning the existence of *synthetic a priori* knowledge depends on a *decision* rather than on an *answer*: "What the decision should be, that is, which meaning (if any) should be attached to the term '*a priori*', it is by no means easy to say. Many factors are involved, by no means the least of which is a sense of belonging to one or other of the two major traditions of Western philosophy.... If one is tired of philosophical shibboleths, and finds important insights on both sides of the fence, one will content oneself with pointing out that while every conceptual frame involves propositions which, though synthetic, are true *ex vi terminorum*, every conceptual frame is also but one among many which compete for adoption in the market-place of experience" (*ITSA*, in *SPR*, 319-320).
- ⁴⁹ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.174.
- ⁵⁰ According to Sellars, learning to use a language doesn't amount to learning to *obey* the rules for the use of its expressions; obeying rules, as a matter of fact, involves using the language in which the rules are formulated leading in this way to a *vicious regress*. To avoid this, we ought to substitute "the phrase 'learning to conform to the rules...' for 'learning to obey the rules...' where 'conforming to a rule enjoining the doing of A in circumstances C' is to be equated simply with 'doing A when the circumstances are C' - regardless of how one comes to do it" (*SRLG*, in *SPR*, 322). In doing so, learning to use a language (L) doesn't entail no longer having learned to use the metalanguage (ML), and so on.
- ⁵¹ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.177.
- ⁵² L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford 2001, pp.27^c-28^c; hereafter *PI*.
- ⁵³ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p.178. The claim that justification is a practice referred to what we already accept amounts to reject, in Sellars' point of view, the falsely atomistic conception of belief: individual beliefs, as a matter of fact, are neither meaningful nor justified in isolation from the conceptual framework of which they are part.
- ⁵⁴ Sellars writes: "Jones thinks out-loud: Lo! Here is a red apple. Now to say that this visual thinking-out-loud that something is the case is epistemically *justified* or *reasonable* or has authority is clearly *not* to say that Jones has correctly inferred from certain premises, which he has good reason to believe, that there is a red apple in front of him. For we are dealing with a *paradigm* case of non inferential belief. *The authority of the thinking accrues to it in quite a different way. It can be traced to the fact that Jones has learned to use the relevant words in perceptual situations*" (*SK*, 324).
- ⁵⁵ Sellars points out: "One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed *must* be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be non-inferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter

of fact, or of general truth; and (b) such that the non-inferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims- particular and general- about the world. It is important to note that I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only non-inferential but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact whether particular or general. It might be thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes knowledge of other facts *must* be inferential. This, however, as I hope to show, is itself an episode in the myth" (*EPM*, 164).

⁵⁶R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., note 12, p.179.

⁵⁷*ENWW*, 646.

⁵⁸*EPM*, 170.

⁵⁹See W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p.273; see also *SM*, 226.

⁶⁰W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p.273.

⁶¹*CDCM*, 285.

⁶²G. Gutting, "Philosophy of Science", in C.F. Delaney, M.J.Loux, Gary Gutting, W.D. Solomon (eds.), *The Synoptic Vision. Essays on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1977, p.88; see also *IM*, 322.

⁶³*EPM*, 160.

⁶⁴R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p. 184.

⁶⁵R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, cit., p. 186.

⁶⁶See J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996, p.46.

⁶⁷J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p.46.

⁶⁸*EPM*, 127.

⁶⁹See *EPM*, sec.62.

⁷⁰*EPM*, 195.

⁷¹*SK*, 59.

⁷²W. A. deVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p.276.

⁷³J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p. xiv.

⁷⁴See *SK*, 295.

⁷⁵*SK*, 2.

⁷⁶*EPM*, 165.

⁷⁷*EPM*, 166.

⁷⁸*EPM*, 167.

⁷⁹*EPM*, 167-168.

⁸⁰*PSIM* in *SPR*, 27.

⁸¹*IAMB* in *PP*, 385.

⁸²Linguistic expressions, in Sellars' point of view, can play three important roles which, in some way, determine also their meanings:

1. *Language-entry transitions* thanks to which a speaker responds to objects (perceptible or introspectible), events or situations with linguistic activity;
2. *Intralinguistic moves* which concern various transition rules of the language like e.g. valid inference rules;
3. *Language-exit transitions* which transform linguistic episodes (e.g. 'I shall now eat a cake') in appropriate behaviors (in the case above, e.g., going to the kitchen, taking a cake and beginning to eat it).

For Sellars, as for Quine and Davidson, words have meaning only in the context of an entire language. See for this subject of matter *LRB*, 310; *SRLG* in *SPR*, 327-31; *NAO*, 67,69.

⁸³*IAMB* in *PP*, 385-6.

⁸⁴W. A. DeVries, *Wilfrid Sellars*, cit., p. 227.

⁸⁵R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, "Sellars and Sense Impressions", *Erkenntnis*, 17, 1982, pp.171-211.

⁸⁶See *SPR*, ch.4.

⁸⁷R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, "Sellars and Sense Impressions", cit., p. 12.

⁸⁸*EPM*, 170. It can be important to note that to dispose of foundation doesn't amount to refuse the possibility of immediate knowledge; the two questions, as a matter of fact, must be distinguished: "Even if there is something radically wrong with the concept of an immediate experience of a particular or of a fact, there is still the claim that some beliefs are self-warranted, the claim that some beliefs are epistemized by reliable noninferential origin, and so on" (W. P. Alston, "What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?", *Synthese*, 55, 1983, p.74.

⁸⁹ J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., pp.135-136.

⁹⁰ J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p.8.

⁹¹ J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p.32.

⁹² J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, cit., p. 34.

⁹³ Distinguishing between a *legend* that doesn't imply neither the existence of an object nor its nonexistence, and a *myth*, which implies the nonexistence of an object, William S. Robinson tries to conclude that Sellars' view on the Given doesn't bring to argue that the Given is a myth; see W.S. Robinson, "The Legend of the Given" in H-N. Castañeda, (ed.), *Action, Knowledge, and Reality*, cit., p.83.

⁹⁴ *RNWR*, 46.

⁹⁵ *RNWR*, 46.

⁹⁶ Cfr. J. F. Rosenberg, *Fusing the images*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p.15.

⁹⁷ *EPM*, 172.

⁹⁸ *NAO*, 1-2.

⁹⁹ See *EPM*, 173.

¹⁰⁰ *EPM*, 173.

¹⁰¹ R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, "Sellars and Sense Impressions", cit., p.14.

¹⁰² *EPM*, 172.

Notes to chapter 4

¹ A preliminary version of this essay appeared with the title "Wittgenstein on colour-issues" in *Dialegethai. Rivista telematica di filosofia*, 10, 2008 [on-line: <http://mondodomani.org/dialegethai/>].

² Wittgenstein as a matter of fact states: "Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of the reality. They present no possible state of affairs. For the one allows every possible state of affairs, the other none." (*TLP*, prop.4.462)

³ See R. Ciuni, "The colour exclusion problem and 'synthetic a priori' propositions between *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Some Remarks on Logical Form*" in A. Coliva, E. Picardi, *Wittgenstein today*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2004, pp.121-139.

⁴ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol.II, Routledge, London 2001, p.21.

⁵ R. Ciuni, "The colour exclusion problem and 'synthetic a priori' propositions between *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Some Remarks on Logical Form*", cit., p.126.

⁶ Proposition 4.221 of *TLP* states: "It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination".

⁷ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol.II, cit., p.21. Husserl states fully and clearly that a synthetic proposition is a specification (*Besonderung*) of synthetic *a priori* laws; empirical specifications are, of course, propositions like "This red is different from this green".

⁸ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol.II, cit., p.19.

⁹ Cfr. F. Waismann, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, Blackwell, Oxford 1979; in part. see pp. 102-107.

¹⁰ Cfr. F. Waismann, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, cit., pp. 67-68.

¹¹ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, cit., p.4.

¹² In *TLP*, prop. 2.0131, Wittgenstein writes: "A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space." In prop. 2.0251, Wittgenstein clarifies also that "Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects".

¹³ See L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour*, Blackwell, Oxford 1977, sec. 218; hereafter *RC*.

¹⁴ Cfr. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, Blackwell, Oxford 1975, sec.219; hereafter *PR*.

¹⁵ *PR*, sec 1.

¹⁶ See *PR*, sec. 219, 220.

¹⁷ *PR*, sec.3.

¹⁸ *PR*, sec.4.

¹⁹ See *PR*, sec. 221.

²⁰ Byong-Chul Park, *Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1998, p.140.

²¹ L. Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations"*, Blackwell, Oxford 1958, p.56.

- ²² L. Wittgenstein, *The Big Typescript: TS 213*, Blackwell, Oxford 2005, p.320e; hereafter *BT*. According to Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka even the introduction of the notion of language-games does not yet provide a basis for rejecting phenomenological language. See M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, Blackwell, Oxford 1986, p.242.
- ²³ For Jaakko Hintikka a typical use of the adjective “phenomenological” is found in thermodynamics where a phenomenological approach is contrasted to a statistical one. See J. Hintikka, “The Idea in Phenomenology”, in K. Lehrer and J.C. Marek (eds.), *Austrian Philosophy: Past and Present. Essays in Honour of Rudolph Haller*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997.
- ²⁴ See for this matter of fact E. Husserl, *Phaenomenologische Psychologie*, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1962, pp.302-303.
- ²⁵ *PR*, sec. I.
- ²⁶ L. Waismann, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, cit., p.45.
- ²⁷ *PR*, sec.11.
- ²⁸ See *PR*, sec. 68; Wittgenstein writes: “Isn’t it clear that this would be the most immediate description we can possibly imagine? That is to say, that anything which tried to be more immediate still would inevitably cease to be a description”.
- ²⁹ See the following passage in *RC*, II, sec. 16: “Phenomenological analysis (as e.g. Goethe would have it) is analysis of concepts and can neither with nor contradict physics”. For this reason Wittgenstein’s researches on colours don’t amount to a psychological investigation, so that all the assertions about them are not assumed as propositions of natural history. See also the following passages in *RC*, III, sec., 9-10: “If we say that the proposition ‘saturated yellow is lighter than saturated blue’ doesn’t belong to the realm of psychology (for only *so* could it be natural history)- this means that we are not *using* it as a proposition of natural history. And the question then is : what is the other, non-temporal *use* like?”. “For this is the only way we can distinguish propositions of ‘the mathematics of colour’ from those of natural history”.
- ³⁰ *BT*, 323e.
- ³¹ *BT*, 324e.
- ³² N. F. Gier, *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1981.
- ³³ P.M.S. Hacker, “The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory”, in I. Block (ed.), *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Blackwell, Oxford 1981, pp.86-87.
- ³⁴ A. Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, The Penguin Press, Harmondsworth 1973, p.114.
- ³⁵ L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Logical Form*, in I.M. Copi, R.W. Beard, (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, London 1966, p. 30; hereafter *RLF*.
- ³⁶ *RLF*, 32.
- ³⁷ *RLF*, 32.
- ³⁸ *RLF*, 35.
- ³⁹ M. McGinn, “Wittgenstein on colour: from logic to grammar”, in A. Coliva, E. Picardi (eds.), *Wittgenstein today*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2004, p. 114.
- ⁴⁰ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford 1953, sec.108; hereafter *PI*.
- ⁴¹ *TLP*, prop. 5.5563.
- ⁴² *PI*, sec. 124.
- ⁴³ *PI*, sec. 125.
- ⁴⁴ *PI*, sec. 126.
- ⁴⁵ L. Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, cit., pp.17-20.
- ⁴⁶ *RC*, sec.1.
- ⁴⁷ *RC*, sec.1-63.
- ⁴⁸ *RC*, sec. III-30.
- ⁴⁹ *RC*, sec. I-76.
- ⁵⁰ *RC*, sec. III-112.
- ⁵¹ In *RC*, III-332, Wittgenstein writes: “Couldn’t seeing be the *exception*? [I.e. rather than blindness being the exception.] But neither the blind nor the sighted could describe it, except as an ability to do this or that. Including e.g. playing certain language-games; but we must be careful how we describe these games”.
- ⁵² *RC*, III-71.
- ⁵³ *RC*, III-72.
- ⁵⁴ M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, , *Investigating Wittgenstein*, cit., p.295.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ *PI*, sec. 56.

⁵⁷ Wittgenstein writes: “[...] the language-game with colours is characterized by what we are able to do, and what we are not able to do” (*Zettel*, sec.345). Another passage contained in *Remarks on Colours* is considerable in order to understand Wittgenstein’s rejection of inner experiences: “If the psychologist teaches us, ‘There are people who see’, we can then ask him: ‘And what do you call ‘people who see’?’” The answer to that would have to be: People who behave so-and-so under such-and-such circumstances” (*RC*, sec. I-88).

⁵⁸ *PI*, sec.280.

⁵⁹ M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, cit., p.301.

⁶⁰ *BT*, 55e-56e.

⁶¹ *RC*, sec. III- 19; see also *RC*, III- 43.

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